Medically Necessary Organ Transplants for Prisoners: Who is Responsible for Payment? by Wright, Jessica
Boston College Law Review
Volume 39
Issue 5 Number 5 Article 5
9-1-1998
Medically Necessary Organ Transplants for
Prisoners: Who is Responsible for Payment?
Jessica Wright
Follow this and additional works at: http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/bclr
Part of the Medical Jurisprudence Commons
This Notes is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Boston College Law Review by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School. For more information,
please contact nick.szydlowski@bc.edu.
Recommended Citation
Jessica Wright, Medically Necessary Organ Transplants for Prisoners: Who is Responsible for Payment?,
39 B.C.L. Rev. 1251 (1998), http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/bclr/vol39/iss5/5
MEDICALLY NECESSARY ORGAN
TRANSPLANTS FOR PRISONERS: WHO
IS RESPONSIBLE FOR PAYMENT?
INTRODUCTION
There is no iron curtain drawn between the Constitution and the
prisons of this country.'
In 1969, James Earl Ray was convicted of murdering Rev. Martin
Luther King Jr. and sentenced to ninety-nine years in a Tennessee
prison.' He confessed to the murder but then recanted, claiming that
he had been framed. 3 He never stopped trying to overturn his convic-
tion.4 King's family, led by his thirty-seven year-old son Dexter Scott
King, vigorously supported Ray and to this day maintain that he was
innocents Ray suffered from end-stage hepatitis C, which he con-
tracted from a blood transfusion he received after being stabbed
twenty-two times in a prison attack in 1981. 6 Ray had been medically
approved for a liver transplant through the University of Pittsburgh
Medical Center, but he was not accepted into the program and was
placed on an organ waiting list.' Before Ray could be placed on the
list, he had to raise a $278,000 deposit and demonstrate that he could
receive proper post-operative care in prison. 8 Ray was unable to raise
the money for the transplant, and the Tennessee Department of Cor-
rections would not finance it. 9 Ray was thus left without options; he
1 Wolff v. McDonald, 418 U.S. 539, 555-56 (1974).
2 See Rob Johnson, James Earl Ray Liver Transplant Status May Be Announced Today, Cont.
APPEAL (Memphis), Nov. 26, 1997, at BIO.
3 See Lawyer Says James Earl Ray Needs a Liver Transplant, STAR-Tans. (Minneapolis-St. Paul),
Jan. 11, 1997, at 6A [het einalter Lawyer Says],
See id.
5 See Old Case, New Data: Bullet that Killed Dr. King May Not Match Others in Gun, SUN-SEN-
TINEL (Fort Lauderdale), July 12, 1997, at IA.
6 See Johnson, supra note 2, at B10.
7 See Male Perrusquia, Ray's Lawyer Says Funds Lacking for Transplant, COM. APPEAL (Mem-
phis), Nov. 27, 1997, at B2,
8 See id,
9 See Perrusquia, supra note 7, at 13,2; Lawyer Says, supra note 3, at 6A. According to Bob
Bradford, the Director of Health Services for the Tennessee Department of Corrections, the
Depluttnent has no mitten policy on funding inmate organ transplants, but the Department does
not pay for transplants and never has. See First Telephone Interview with Bob Bradford, Director
of Health Services, Tennessee Department of Correction (Feb. 17, 1998) [hereinafter First
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could not raise the money himself because he was incarcerated and
the state refused to pay for the treatment. On April 23, 1998, at the
age of 70, Ray died of liver failure.°
Issues relating to organ transplants for prisoners have not yet been
studied at any great length, in part because prisons are only recently
seeing inmates who are aging or very sick." In Michigan, for example,
the first evaluation of an inmate for major organ transplant surgery
did not occur until 1997. 12
 Rising prison populations and health care
costs have forced prison authorities to make tough choices.° These
choices, however, must be made within constitutional limitations, and
courts have consistently held that a lack of funds does not justify
denying medical care to inmates. 14
This Note demonstrates that the government's refusal to fund
medically necessary organ transplants for prisoners, whether through
formal legislation or internal prison regulations, where the inmate
himself is indigent and cannot pay, violates the Eighth Amendment's
prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment.' 5 Part I identifies
the scope of the health care funding problem in the United States.°
Part II discusses United Network for Organ Sharing ("UNOS"), the
transplant umbrella organization, and the organ allocation process."
Part III considers issues specific to prisoners receiving organ trans-
plants."' Part IV examines the Eighth Amendment's ban on cruel and
unusual punishment and applies it to the medical care context.° It
Telephone Interview with Bob Bradford]. Bradford stated that the Department allows organ
transplant surgery only if the prisoner pays for it himself. See id. According to Pam Bobbins,
spokesperson for the Tennessee Department of Corrections, post-operative care must also be
funded by the inmate. See Perrusquia, supra note 7, at B2.
°See Church Didn't Want to Endorse Ray's Claim of Innocence, Coy. APPEAL (Memphis), May
28, 1998, at B1 [hereinafter Claim of Innocence].
11 see Judy Putnam, Inmate's Failing Heart Poses Transplant Policy Challenge, GRAND RAPIDS
PRESS, Aug. 18, 1997, at Al. The aging of the prison population is a result of these trends:
(1) older people constitute the fastest growing segment of the population; (2) the percentage of
older persons arrested for serious crimes is increasing; and (3) offenders serving long-term
sentences are aging. See Cheryl Crawford, Health Care Needs in Corrections: NI] Responds, 228
NAT'L INST. OF JUST. J. 31, 34-35 (Nov. 1994).
12 See Putnam, supra note 11, at Al.
15 See Michael Cameron Friedman, Note, Cruel and Unusual Punishment in the Provision of
Prison Medical Care: Challenging the Deliberate Indifference Standard, 45 VAND. L. Rev. 921, 934
(1992).
14 See, e.g., City of Revere v. Massachusetts Gen. Hosp., 463 U.S. 239, 245 (1983); Monmouth
County Correctional Inst. Inmates v Lanzaro, 834 F.2d 326, 351 (3d Cir. 1987); Ancata v. Prison
Health Serv., 769 F.2d 700, 705 (11th Cir. 1985).
15 See infra notes 22-380 and accompanying text.
15 See infra notes 22-38 and accompanying text.
17 See infra notes 39-74 and accompanying text.
18 See infra notes 75-108 and accompanying text.
19 See infra notes 109-263 and accompanying text. This Note is limited to examining the
September 19981	 ORGAN TRANSPLANTS FOR PRISONERS 	 1253
specifically examines the medical professional judgment standard es-
tablished by the United States Supreme Court in Estelle v. Gamble. 2° Part
V analyzes the constitutionality of denying funding for transplants in
light of the information presented. 2 '
I. THE PROBLEM OF FUNDING PRISONER'S HEALTH CARE NEEDS
The recent dramatic rise in health care costs raises serious con-
cerns about the funding of expensive health care procedures such as
organ transplants." In 1990, health care spending in the United States
exceeded $600 billion and was rising at four times the rate of infla-
tion, 25 There is a fiscal dilemMa within the nation's prison systems
because of the high cost of medical care, shrinking governmental
budgets, the unwillingness of prison administrators to allocate scarce
funds to medical services and an increasing frustration on the part of
taxpayers with the government's willingness to spend tax dollars on
criminals. 24 Moreover, the cost of health care for prisoners has risen
just as rapidly as medical costs for the general population and spending
for health care is increasing faster than other correctional costs.° For
instance, between 1982 and 1989, at least eleven states increased their
annual health cost per inmate by over 100% . 2b Texas increased its
annual health care expenditure per inmate by 472%. 27 Between 1990
and 1996, spending on federal inmate health care increased from $138
million to $327 million, an increase in average cost per inmate of over
60%. 28 In addition, prison inmates may actually require more medical
services than the general public because they suffer from an above-av-
erage incidence of most illnesses and because they are prone to hypo-
Eighth Amendment's application to organ transplant funding for prisoners. Prisoners can bring
challenges based on the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection and Due Process clauses as
well.
20 See infra notes 140-263 and accompanying text.
21 See infra notes 264-367 and accompanying text. This Note is limited to a constitutional
examination of the government's obligation to fund organ transplants For prisoners. It does not
attempt to address any of the obvious ethical implications of basing transplant decisions on
medical criteria rather 'than on the perceived social worth of the transplant recipient...
22 See Putnam, supra note 11, at Al.
23 See B. Jaye Anno, The Cost of Correctional Health Care; Results of a National Survey, 9 J. or
PRISON & JAIL HEALTII 105, 118 (1990).
24 See Friedman, supra note 13, at 934; Putnam, supra note 11, at Al.
25 See Crawford, supra note 11, at 36. The prison population has been growing rapidly as well:
in 1995, there were 1,126,287 prisoners in the federal and state systems. See BUREAU OF JUSTICE
STATISTICS, U.S. DEPT OF JUSTICE, CORREUTIONAL POPULATIONS IN TILE UNITED STATES, 1995,
86 [hereinafter BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS].
28 See Anno, supra note 23, at 113.
27 See id,
28 See Thomas (visited Mar, 27, 1998) <http://thornas.loc.gov/cenip/-r105cfxRGi:c19873 >.
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chondria and malingering. 22 Organ transplant procedures are among
the most expensive medical procedures available and many individuals
who need transplants cannot afford to pay for them." Transplant
costs include transplant evaluation and testing, transplant surgery, fol-
low-up care, laboratory tests and medication.3 ' In 1996, for example,
the estimated cost of a liver transplant was $314,500, with annual
follow-up costs of $21,900. 32 Similarly, the estimated cost of a heart
transplant was $253,200, with annual follow-up costs of $21,200. 33 Pri-
vate insurers are often reluctant to cover the high cost of transplant
procedures and, until fairly recently, avoided coverage by deeming the
procedures "experimental."34
 Although private insurers have begun
expanding coverage, they consistently do not include organ transplants
in individual contracts." Medicare covers only procedures deemed
non-experimental by the National Institute of Health." Moreover, or-
gan transplants are not covered by Medicaid in a uniform manner;
rather, each state determines its own eligibility standards and the scope
of available benefits." Medicaid benefits are unavailable to prisoners."
"See Friedman, supra note 13, at 943. Commentators suggest that prisoners (1) have more
genuine health problems, (2) are more generally concerned for their bodily well-being and
(3) avail themselves of health services because they are bored or lonely, because they seek excuses
from assigned work or because they'seek numbing medication. See id.
so See UNOS—Patients (visited June 9, 1998) Chttp://www.unos.org/Patients/financ_costs .
tarn>.
31 See id. Other costs include time spent in the hospital's Intensive Care Unit, fees for
transplant surgeons, anasthesia, recovery of the organ from the donor, transportation, food and
lodging near the transplant center, rehabilitation costs and the cost of anti-rejection drugs, which
are required for the rest of the patient's life. See id. Anti-rejection drugs can cost over 510,000
per year. See id.
32 See id.
" See id.
54 See Raymond D. Cotton & Andrew L. Sandler, The Regulation of Organ Procurement and
Transplantation in the U.S., 7 J. LEGAL MED. 55, 75 (1986).
" See id. In the mid-1980s, approximately 80% of commercial insurers, including Blue Cross
and Blue Shield, covered both heart and liver transplants. See James F. Childress, Some Moral
Connections Between Organ Procurement and Organ Distribution, 3 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. &
85, 109 (1987).
36 See Cotton & Sandler, supra note 34, at 75. Medicare covers heart, liver and lung trans-
plants, but not pancreas transplants. See 60 Fed. Reg. 6537 (1995); 56 Fed. Reg. 15,006 (1991);
52 Fed. Reg. 10,935 (1987).
" See Cotton & Sandler, supra note 34, at 80. As of 1997, Medicaid paid for heart transplants
in 34 states. See Putnam, supra note:11, at Al. In Michigan, Medicaid paid for 13 transplants in
1993 and 15 transplants in 1994. See id.
55 See 42 U.S.C. § 1396d (a) (25) . (A) (1994). The statute excludes from coverage "payments
with respect to care or services for any individual who is an inmate of a public institution (except
as a patient in a medical institution)." Id.
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II. UNOS AND THE ORGAN ALLOCATION PROCESS
The United Network for Organ Sharing ("UNOS") is the umbrella
organization that manages transplant waiting lists and decisions nation-
wide.39 Congress 'created this system for organ donation and distribu-
tion in 1984 through the Organ Procurement and Transplantation Act
("OPTA")." UNOS is a private, non-profit agency based in Virginia,
and it operates both the Organ Procurement and Transplantation
Network ("OPTN") and the United States Scientific Registry of Trans-
plant Recipients ("Registry"), both authorized by OPTA, under con-
tract to the United States Department of Health and Human Services
("HHS"). 4 ' Because UNOS is an independent, non-profit agency, its
operations and policies are to some measure insulated from the politi-
cal process." Congress wanted to separate politics from the organ
donation and distribution system and to prevent fame and notoriety
from influencing decisions." In response to these concerns, Congress
required HHS to contract with a non-governmental organization to
manage the allocation of organs through collective decisionmaking. 44
Every transplant program, organ procurement organization and
tissue-typing laboratory in. the United States is a member of UNOS. 45
As of November 1997, UNOS had a total of 440 members, including
275 transplant centers. 46 UNOS members must meet certain minimum
standards in areas such as quality of services provided and they must
agree to follow UNOS policies and by-laws. 47 UNOS policy prohibits
access to the waiting lists and the computer system by non-members,
so individuals cannot gain access to the waiting list without approval
by an UNOS transplant program." The UNOS membership develops
policy governing the entire transplant community through regional
3° See LINOS About UNOS (visited June 9, 1998) Chttp://www.unos.org/About/who_main .
hun>.
"See Cotton & Sandler, supra note 34,' 57; Dr. John Rabid'', Patient are v. Market Share,
Cwa. APPEAL (Memphis), Dec. 15, 1997, at A9.
41 See Cotton & Sandler, supra note 34, at 58; Organ Transplants: Patients on Waiting List Up
300 Percent from 1988 to 1995, HRSA Report Finds, HEALTH CARE DAILY (BNA), Feb. 4, 1997, at
d4 [hereinafter Patients on Waiting List).
42 See Rabid'', supra note 40, at. A9.	 '
43 See id. These kinds of charges were raised when Mickey Mantle, a Hall of Fame baseball
player, received a liver transplant. See id.
44 See id.
45 See UNOS—About UNOS, supra note 39.
46 See UNOS—Newsroom: Critical Data (visited June 9, 1998) Chttp://www.unos.otg/News-
room/clitdata_main.htin >.
47 See LINOS Policies 1., 2., LINOS Policies and Bylaws (visited June 9, 1998) <http://www.
unos.org/About/policy_policiesi.htm >.
43 See UNOS Policies 3.2.1.1., 3.2.1.2., UNOS—Policies and Bylaws, supra note 47.
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meetings, national committee deliberations and ultimate approval by
a forty-member board of directors comprised of medical professionals,
transplant recipients and donor family members."It also obtains input
from transplant professionals, patients and their families, the public
and HHS representatives.'"
For organ allocation, purposes, UNOS has divided the United
States into eleven regions and staffs each with an UNOS administra-
tor." As a general policy matter, organs are first offered in the region
in which they were donated." This policy reduces organ preservation
time, improves organ quality, reduces costs and increases access to
available organs."
The UNOS Organ Center manages the national transplant waiting
list and matches organ donors with recipients." Access to the organ
transplant waiting list is not automatic." First, a patient's regular doctor
must refer her to a transplant center." At the center, the patient
receives an independent evaluation during which the center's physi-
cian determines whether the patient is an appropriate candidate for
an organ transplant." Different transplant programs use different cri-
teria to determine whether the patient should be placed on the waiting
list for a particular organ, so variations in medical practices among
transplant centers can result in discrepancies in waiting times for
individual patients." If the patient meets the criteria of the center, she
can be added to the waiting list and will be registered with the UNOS
Organ Center.59
 The Center uses a centralized computer network to
link all organ procurement organizations and transplant centers to
maximize the chances of finding matches." When an organ is donated,
45
 See UNOS—About UNOS, supra note 39.
50 See Rabkin, supra note 40, at A9.
51
 See UNOS—About UNOS, supra note 39.
ss see id.
53 See id.
54 See id.
55
 See id.
56
 See UNOS-Patients, supra note 39. A transplant center is a hospital which, as a member of
UNOS, performs transplants. See UNOS Policy 3.1.2., UNOS—Policies and Bylaws, supra note 47.
57 See id.
55
 See UNOS Rationale for Objectives of Equitable Organ Allocation, UNOS—Newsroom, supra
note 46. In addition, patients may be accepted by one program although they have been rejected
by others. See Anita Srikarneswaran, Precious Organs, Endangered Lives: Ethicists Debate Worth of
Inmates, Alcoholics, Drug Abusers, HI V Infected, PirrshuRcii POST-GAZETTE, Sept. 21, 1997, at Al.
For example, James Earl Ray was rejected by both transplant programs in Tennessee, but was
subsequently evaluated as "medically qualified" at the University of Pittsburgh Medical Center.
See Perrusquia, supra note 7, at 132; Srikaineswaran, supra, at Al.
59
 See UNOS—Patients, supra note 30.
60 See id.
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the procuring organization enters relevant information into the UNOS
computer network, which gener ates a list of potential recipients based
on objective medical criteria." The transplant coordinator begins at
the top of the list and contacts the patients' transplant centers. 62 Once
contacted by UNOS, the center can either accept the organ or reject
it if the transplant team foresees particular problems with the organ. 66
It is not unusual for a transplant team to turn down an offer for an
organ."
UNOS is responsible for prioritizing the candidates for organs.
UNOS bases its policy decisions on objective medical criteria, not on
the perceived social worth of those seeking organs. 65 The UNOS ethics
committee believes, for example, that being accused or convicted of a
crime is irrelevant to the selection of transplant recipients. 66 Moreover,
because of the unique characteristics of each human organ, the waiting
lists for each organ are maintained separately and use different criteria
to determine whether a transplant is appropriate for an individual
patient.67 All of these policies for organ waiting lists account for tech-
nical medical data, such as blood type, antigens and medical urgency,
as well as geographic factors, but they do not account for the social
worth of the patient. 66 Many people view this as unfair and believe it
contributes to the shortage of organ donations in the country. 69 Be-
cause public opinion is so strongly against giving scarce organs to
convicted criminals, patients fear that news of transplants to such
"undeserving" people will decrease the number of donations." Public
distrust of medical institutions is a significant reason why people refuse
to donate organs, and commentators worry that if the public perceives
63 See
62
 See id. First, the list of patients waiting in the local area is checked, then the regional list
is checked and then if no match has been made the organ will be made available nationwide. See
id.
63 See id.
64 See UNOS—Newsroom: All About UNOS, supra note 46.
66 See id.
66 See Srikameswaran, supra note 58, at Al,
67 See UNOS—Policies and Bylaws, supra note 47. For example, UNOS policy 3.5 deals with
the allocation of cadaveric kidneys; policy 3.6 handles liver allocation; policy 3.7 is for thoracic
organs (heart and lung); policy 3.8 is for pancreas allocation; policy 3.9 is for all other organs
not specifically addressed; and policy 3.11 is for intestinal organ allocation (stomach, small and
large intestine, gastro•intestinal tract). See id.
" See UNOS: About UNOS (visited June 9, 1998) ehttp://www.uuos.org/About/what,_organ .
htm>.
69 See Srikameswaran, supra note 58, at Al,
7° See id.
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the distribution policies as unfair, then public distrust will increase,
thereby reducing the effectiveness of efforts to procure organs. 7 '
The shortage of organs in the United States cannot be overem-
phasized and the demand for organs keeps rising. According to the
Annual Report on Transplant Data released in February 1997, the
number of patients waiting for organ transplants increased by 300%
between 1988 and 1995, while the number of donors increased by only
30%.72
 The number of patients who have died while on an organ
transplant waiting list rose from 1507 in 1988 to 3549 in 1995.Th As of
September 2, 1998, there were 58,114 patients on the national trans-
plant waiting list. 71
III. PRISONERS IN THE ORGAN TRANSPLANT COMMUNITY
Prisoners have received orgari and bone marrow transplants in the
past. 75
 For instance, in the University of Pittsburgh Medical Center
program alone, approximately twenty people were in some way in-
volved in the criminal process when they received organs.76 Three of
these twenty were actually serving prison sentences when they had the
surgery, but none had received the death penalty or life sentences. 77
To date, no death row inmate in the nation is believed to have received
a transplant. 75
Because UNOS bases all of its transplant decisions on purely
objective medical criteria, being accused or convicted of a crime is
theoretically irrelevant to the selection of transplant recipients. 79 The
practical effect of applying objective medical criteria, however, often
• 71 See Childress, supra note 35, at 89; Paul P. Lee, The Organ Supply Dilemma: Acute Responses
to a Chronic Shortage, 20 CoLum. J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 363, 369 (1986). Commentators suggest that
the public fears that if doctors know an individual is willing to donate her organs, then fewer
life-saving measures will be taken to prevent her death. See id.
72 See Patients on Waiting List, supra note 41, at d4.
r See id.
74 See UNOS—Newsroom: Critical Data, supra note 46.
75 See Michele Grygotis, Washington State Legislature's Rush to Pass Bill Prohibiting State to
Fund Organ Transplants for Patients on Death Row Appears to be Based on Hoax, TRANSPLANT
NEWS, Nov. 30, 1996. Because there is no way to tell from the information which UNOS gathers
whether a patient is a prisoner, UNOS has no statistics on the number of transplants performed
on prison inmates. See E-mail from Sarnia Buckingham, UNOS Research Department, to Jessica
Wright., Topics Editor, Boston College Law Review (Feb. 16, 1998) (on file with author). Joel
Newman, a spokesman for UNOS, characterized inmate transplants as "infrequent." See Caroline
Young Ullmann, Questions & Answers, NEWS Thm. (Tacoma), May 18, 1997.
" See Srikameswaran, supra note 58, at Al.
77 See id.
78 See Grygotis, supra note 75.
79 See Srilcameswaran, supra note 58, at Al.
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prevents inmates from gaining access to the waiting lists." For example,
Mindy Brass, a Michigan inmate sentenced to life imprisonment with-
out chance of parole, needs a heart transplant but was rejected by one
of the three transplant teams in Michigan because of her history of
drug abuse. 8 ' Likewise, a doctor on the University of Pittsburgh liver
transplant team stated that convicted Whitewater defendant Jim Guy
Tucker would not get a liver transplant if he was sentenced to serve
time in prison because of the heightened risk of post-surgical infection
and the inadequate post-operative support system in prison. 82 Similarly,
James Earl Ray was denied by both transplant programs in Tennessee,
in part because transplant physicians were concerned about the avail-
ability of post-operative care in the prison system."
States have approached the problem of funding organ transplants
for prisoners in various ways. 84 For example, the state of Washington
attempted to deal with the issue, at least in part, through legislation. 85
In 1996, a bill which would have banned public use of funding for
organ transplants for inmates sentenced to death passed both houses,
but was vetoed by then-Governor Mike Lowry." The Governor's veto
message stated that the bill was "most probably a violation of the
prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment." 87 The bill was
re-introduced in 1997 with minor modifications, but it died in the
Senate Rules Committee as the deadlines for its approval expired."
According to Bob Jones, Health Care Coordinator for the Washington
Department of Corrections, if a prisoner is approved for a transplant
by a transplant center, the case will be referred to the Utilization
Review Committee ("Committee"), which will determine on a case-by-
"See Joan I. Duffy, Tucker Gets Probation Because of Poor Health; Prison for Whitewater Role a
Death Sentence, Judge Says, Cost. APPEAL (Memphis), Aug. 20, 1996, at Al; Putnam, supra note
11, at Al.
81 See Putnam, supra note 11, at Al. Mindy Brass was released from prison in July of 1998
and granted a new trial, after a judge determined that the prosecution had withheld evidence
during her 1992 ilia]. See Judy Putnam, A Second Chance, GRAND RAPIDS Puss, Aug, 11, 1998,
at B4 [hereinafter A Second Chance]. She is still waiting to be approved by a heart transplant team
and was added to the national waiting list. See id.
82 See Duffy, supra note 80, at Al.
83 See St ikaineswatull, supra note 58, at Al.
84 See, e.g., 513 5190, 55th Leg., 1997 Reg. Sess. (Wa. 1997); First Telephone Interview with
Bob, Bradford, supra note 9; Telephone Interview with Gayle Lafferty, Adminisuator, Bureau of
Health Cale, Michigan Department of Corrections (Feb. 23, 1998) [hereinafter Telephone
Interview with Gayle Lafferty].
85 513 5190, 55th Leg., 1997 Reg. Sess. (Wa. 1997).
88 See Lisa Krenier Sc Peter Callaghan, Legislation Would Change Date of Slate Primary Election
Day, NEWS Tate. (Tacoma), Jan. 18, 1997, at B3.
87 See HEALTH CARE DAILY (BNA), Apr. 3, 1996, at d19.
88 See Washington State Legislature (visited Sept. 12, 1998) Chttp://leginfo. leg.wa.gov/
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case basis whether to authorize payment for the transplant.89 The
Offender Health Plan ("Plan"), which describes the scope of available
services and lists limitations and exclusions, states that organ trans-
plants are excluded from coverage unless the Committee overrides the
Plan." The Committee will first seek alternative methods of funding,
such as private insurance or veterans groups. 91 If the only source of
available funding is the Department, the Committee can deny to pay
for the transplant. 92 Jones stated, however, that to his knowledge this
has never happened." Jones asserted that at least "a couple" of kidney
transplants have been funded by the Department because it is more
cost-effective to pay for the transplant than to maintain patients on
dialysis. 94
Other states have no written policy addressing organ transplants."
For instance, in Tennessee, according to Bob Bradford, Director of
Health Services for the Department of Corrections, the Department
has no written policy on the funding of organ transplants. 96 Bradford
stated that although there is no written policy, the Department's stance
is that it will not pay for the procedure.97
 Bradford acknowledged that
if an inmate's physician or family member requests an organ trans-
plant, the Department will determine the course of treatment on a
pubibillingo/senate/5175-5199/5190_history>, Telephone Inter view with Kai Trapp, Office of
Washington State Senator Calivan Going (Aug. 27, 1998). Northwest Life Center, a private firm
which provides dialysis and other transplant-related services to Washington inmates, opposed
passage of the bill. See Telephone Interview with Bob Jones, Health Care Coordinator, Washington
Department of Corrections (Aug. 21, 1998) [hereinafter Second Telephone Interview with Bob
Jones]. The legislation discriminated against a class of people (death tow inmates), which would
put Northwest Life Center's federal funding at risk. See id. The Veteran's Adminstration also
opposed the bill. See id.
82 See First Telephone Interview with Bob Jones, supra note 9.
90 See WASHINGTON STATE DEP'T OF CORRECTIONS, OFFENDER HEALTII PLAN § S (Dec. 13,
1996). The utilization review process is conducted at the Washington Department of Corrections
headquarters. See id. § 4. The Utilization Review Committee may include the offender's primary
care physician, other health care providers, the facility's Superintendent, the facility's Health Care
Manager and the Administrator of Health Services. See id. The review team makes a t ecommen-
dation to the Secretary for approval and the final determination is shared with the prisoner
through a Deparunen t health care provider. See id. The prisoner may appeal the decision through
the Department's established grievance program. See id.
91 See Second Telephone Interview with Bob Jones, supra note 88.
92 See id.
63 See id.
94 See id.
95
 See First Telephone Interview with Bob Bradford, supra note 9; Telephone Interview with
Gayle Lafferty, supra note 84.
96 See First Telephone Interview with Bob Bradford, supra note 9.
97 See id.
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case-by-case basis. 08 Bradford stated, however, that to his knowledge,
the Department has never paid for an organ transplant. 99
In Michigan, the Department of Corrections has no written policy
on funding organ transplants and does not plan to write one, accord-
ing to Gayle Lafferty, an administrator in the Department's Bureau of
Health Care. 10° Lafferty stated that Department officials anticipate that
inmates rarely will require organ transplants, thus rendering a written
policy unnecessary. 1 °' Only one inmate in the state's history has sought
a major organ transplant. 1 °2
Because of events which have occurred recently in these states, the
issue of funding for transplants has been removed from the top of the
political agenda and government officials will not have to make a
decision on this matter in the immediate future. 1 °5 For example, at
present, the failure of SB5 1 90 to pass in the Washington state legisla-
ture removes the issue of funding transplants for death row inmates
from the political process. 1 °'1 In Tennessee, James Earl Ray's death
ended the controversy about whether the Department of Corrections
should pay for a liver transplant to extend his life.'° 5 In Michigan,
Mindy Brass's release from prison removed the funding decision from
the Department of Corrections altogether. 1 °8 The issue is certain to
arise again, whether in these states or elsewhere, given that prison
populations are continuing to rise and that organ transplant technol-
ogy is advancing rapidly. 1 °7 Individualized consideration of each in-
mate's case, as occurs in Tennessee, Michigan and Washington
through the Utilization Review Process, will probably continue to be
the predominant method of dealing with the funding question, at least
until states see a need to formulate specific, written policies.' 08
" See id.
99 See id.
I" See Telephone Interview with Gayle Lafferty, supra note 84.
101 See id.
102 See Putnam, supra note 11, at Al.
1°3 See A Second Chance, supra note 81; Claim of Innocence, supra note 10; Second Telephone
Interview with Bob Jones, supra note 88.
1 °4 See Second Telephone Interview with Bob Jones, supra note 88.
1°5 See A Claim of Innocence, supra note 10.
1 °8 See A Second Chance, supra note 80. Because Brass's legal status is now "innocent," she will
qualify for Medicaid, which pays for heal t transplants. See td.
' 07 See BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, supra note 25.
1 °8 See supra notes 89-102.
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IV. THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT'S BAN ON CRUEL AND UNUSUAL
PUNISHMENT
The Eighth Amendment, from which the government's duty to
provide medical care to prisoners stems, prohibits the federal govern-
ment from inflicting cruel and unusual punishment.'°° It is clear that
this prohibition also applies to the states through the Fourteenth
Amendment's Due Process Clause. 11° Moreover, provisions similar to
the Eighth Amendment are found in virtually every state constitu-
tion."'
A. Historical Perspective
The ban on cruel and unusual punishment was originally adopted
in the English Declaration of Rights of 1689 to curtail torturous physi-
cal punishments." 2
 Until the early twentieth century, the prohibition
was interpreted narrowly, as merely a protection against torture and
other barbaric forms of punishment." 5
 Until recently, the Cruel and
Unusual Punishment Clause was not interpreted as an affirmative duty
of the state to provide medical care to its prisoners."'
In addition to the narrow interpretation of the Cruel and Unusual
Punishment Clause, judicial interference with the administration of
punishments was limited by the "hands-off doctrine," which recognized
the necessity of according prison officials vast discretion in administra-
don and discipline. 115
 For example, in 1954, in Wagner v. Ragen, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that a
"9 U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. The Eighth Amendment states that —excessive bail shall not be
required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted," Id.
110 See Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 667 (1962) (applying the Eighth Amendment to
the states).
111 Set, e.g., Billings v. Gates, 916 P.2d 291, 293 (1996) (decided under Article I, section 16
of the Oregon Constitution which states that "[c[ruel and unusual punishments shall not be
inflicted").
112 See Friedman, supra note 13, at 925.
115 See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102 (1976).
"4
 See Wesley P. Shields, Comment, Prisoner Health Care: Is It Proper to Charge Inmates for
Health Services?, 32 Hous. L. REV. 271, 276 (1995).
115
 See, e.g., Coppinger v. Townsend, 398 F.2d 392, 393 (10th Cit. 1968) ("The internal affairs
of prisons, including the discipline, treatment, and care of prisoners are ordinarily the responsi-
bility of prison administrators and not subject to judicial review"); Jackson v. Bishop, 404 F.2d
571, 577 (8th Cir. 1968) (noting the natural reluctance to interfere with a prison's internal
discipline); Friedman, supra note 13, at 927-28. The hands-off doctrine was based on the theory
of separation of powers, the lack of judicial expertise in penology and the fear that judicial
intervention would subvert prison discipline. See Carl T. Diesehler, Annotation, Relief Under Civil
Rights Acts to State Prisoners Complaining of Denial of Medical Care, 28 A.L.R. Fed. 279, 295 (1976).
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prisoner had no right to maintain an action alleging due process and
Civil Rights Act violations because federal courts do not have the power
to regulate the ordinary internal management and discipline of state
operated prisons." 6 In Wagner, the prisoner alleged that the warden
refused to permit him to register his inventions with the United States
Patent Office and that the warden seized the oil paintings that the
prisoner had painted while in prison.'''' The court first noted that the
federal courts have held that they have no authority to regulate the
internal management of state prisons." 8 The court then noted
that prison officials have wide discretion to protect the prisoners in
their custody and that, so long as reasonably maintained, discipline in
state prisons is not supervised through the federal courts." 9 The court
reasoned that the same principle of non-intervention applies when a
prisoner is in a federal penitentiary.'" Thus, the Seventh Circuit held
that the federal courts had no jurisdiction to supervise the internal
management of state prisons.'"
Recently, courts have limited the hands-off doctrine to circum-
stances that necessarily accompany prison life, such as discipline or
security issues, and no longer invoke the doctrine in cases involving
serious infringements on inmate rights. 122 The hands-off doctrine no
longer prevents judicial review of prisoner complaints which establish
the existence of a constitutional infringement on the prisoner's
rights.' 23 This is especially true in the medical context, where the
policy of deference to the judgment of prison officials does not apply
as strongly as it does in other contexts. 12" For example, in 1970, in
Martinez v. Mancusi, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit held that an action against prison officials for inadequate medi-
" 5 2 1 3 F.2d 294, 295 (7th Cir. 1954).
"7 See id.
" 5 See id.
115 See id. (quoting Kelly v. Dowd, 140 F.2d 81, 83 (7th Cir. 1944)).
1 Y0 See id.
121 See 1Vagner, 213 F,2d at 295.
122 See Todaro v. Wald, 565 F.2d 48, 53 (2d Cir. 1977) (traditional hands-off attitude toward
daily problems of prison administration does not encompass valid constitutional claims arising
in federal and state institutions); Martinez v. Mancusi, 448 F.2d 921, 923 (2d Cir. 1970); Friedman,
supra note 13, at 928.
I" See Todaro, 565 F.2d at 53; Martinez, 443 F.2d at 923; Friedman, supra note 13, at 928.
I" See Wellman v. Faulkner, 715 F.2d 269, 272, 274 (7th Cir. 1983) (relying on principle that
deferring to prison officials on prison discipline and security does not apply with the same force
in the medical context and holding that failure to provide a proper staff, sufficient supplies or
adequate medical treatment at a prison medical facility violates the Eighth Amendment); cf.
Todaro, 565 F,2d at 54 (less deference to state officials if prison discipline or security is not at
issue).
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cal care could be brought in the federal district courts under the Civil
Rights Act when the violations rose to the level of cruel and unusual
punishment) 25 In Martinez, the prisoner alleged that after he under-
went surgery, he was transferred back to the prison before he was ready
to be moved and forced to walk on his injured leg in violation of his
doctor's orders, which ultimately caused his surgery to be unsuccess-
ful. 126
 The court reasoned that, although federal courts are normally
reluctant to interfere with the normal processes of state prison admini-
stration, they readily intervene where action is necessary to protect a
prisoner's constitutional rights)" Thus, the Second Circuit held that
federal courts have jurisdiction over complaints which allege violations
of constitutional rights) 28
In addition to limiting the hands-off doctrine, the courts have
expanded the scope of the Eighth Amendment to include a broad
range of punishments, including conditions of confinement which are
not directly attributable to the execution of a sentence)29
 In 1910, in
Weems v. United States, the United States Supreme Court began to
expand its definition of cruel and unusual punishment, holding that
fifteen years of hard labor was a disproportionately harsh sentence and
thus violated the Eighth Amendment)" The plaintiff had been con-
victed of falsifying an entry in a government payroll book."' The Court
reasoned that the concept of cruel and unusual punishment may
acquire new meaning as public sentiment develops and "becomes
enlightened by a humane justice."'" The Court thus held that a sen-
tence of fifteen years of hard labor for falsifying an entry in a govern-
ment document was too inconsistent with the public's sense of humane
justice to survive scrutiny under the Eighth Amendment)"
Similarly, in 1958, in Trop v. Dulles, the United States Supreme
Court further expanded the scope of the Cruel and Unusual Punish-
ment Clause by holding unconstitutional a section of the Nationality
Act of 1940, which divested an individual of his or her citizenship for
deserting the military in time of war.' 54
 The plaintiff, a private in the
123 443 F.2d at 923.
126 see id.
' 27 See id.
' 2 .2 See id
129 See, e.g., Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958); Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349,
381, 382 (1910); Friedman, supra note 13, at 925.
1 " See Weems, 217 U.S. at 381, 382.
131 See id. at 357, 358.
1 " See id. at 378.
1 " See id. at 582. The Court was, in part, reacting to public sentiment about harsh prison
conditions. See Shields, supra note 114, at 277.
134 556 U.S. at 101. Section 401(g) of the Nationality Act states that "[a] person who is a
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United States Army, escaped from a stockade and surrendered willingly
the following day.'" He was subsequently convicted of desertion and
dishonorably discharged.'" In 1952, his application for a passport was
denied because he had lost his citizenship, and he filed suit seeking a
declaratory judgment that he was a citizen. 137 The Court reasoned that
denationalization, although it involves no physical mistreatment, is a
form of punishment more primitive than torture because it destroys
an individual's political existence and, as a result, subjects the individ-
ual to constant fear and distress.'" The Court reasoned that the basic
concept underlying the prohibition against cruel and unusual punish-
ment is human dignity and that the Amendment must draw its mean-
ing from the "evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of
a maturing society."'" The Court thus held that denationalization,
although not the type of punishment that had been addressed pre-
viously by the courts, violated the Eighth Amendment.'"
B. Estelle v. Gamble: The Medical Professional Judgment Standard
In 1976, in Estelle v. Gamble, the United States Supreme Court held
that deliberate indifference by prison personnel to a prisoner's serious
medical needs constituted cruel and unusual punishment under the
Eighth Aniendment.m In Estelle, a state prisoner was injured when a
bale of cotton fell on him.'" He was treated at the prison hospital twice
that day and on fifteen additional occasions throughout the sub-
sequent three months.'" In reaching its decision, the Court reasoned
that although the state was normally not obligated to provide medical
care to its citizens, it was forced to provide care to those whom it
incarcerated because the incarcerated prisoners could not care for
themselves.'" The Court further reasoned that inmates must rely on
national of the United States ... shall lose his nationality by—(g) deserting the military or naval
forces of the United States in time of war, provided he is convicted thereof by court martial and
as the result of such conviction is dismissed or dishonorably discharged . . . ." 8 U.S.C.
§ 1481 (a) (8) (repealed 1978) .
135 See Trop, 356 U.S. at 87.
135 See id at 88.
137 See id.
135 See id. at 101-02.
1" See id. at 100-01.
140 See Troll, 356 U.S. at 101; see also Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 272-73 (1972) (physical
suffering can be a factor in determining whether a punishment is cruel and unusual, but Eighth
Amendment violations can occur even in the absence of physical mistreatment because the clause
prohibits punishments that arc degrading to human dignity).
141 429 U.S. at 104.
142 See id. at 99.
143 See id. at 99, 107.
14-1 See id. at 103-04; see also Spicer v. Williamson, 132 S.E. 291, 293 (N.C. 1926) ("It is but
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prison officials for their medical needs and therefore, officials' failure
to treat these needs may produce unnecessary pain, suffering, torture
or a lingering death.'" The Court determined that a prison violates a
prisoner's right to medical care only if prison officials are deliberately
indifferent to serious medical needs)" As a result, the Court indicated
that the test excludes accidents, deliberate indifference to needs which
are not serious and negligence. 147
 The Court decided that, in this case,
the prisoner did not have an Eighth Amendment claim because he was
seen by medical personnel on seventeen occasions in three months,'"
In addition, the Court stated that the decision not to order x-rays for
him was a medical judgment that, at most, amounted to medical
malpractice, not cruel and unusual punishment.'" Thus, the Court
held that prison authorities' deliberate indifference to the serious
medical needs of prisoners violates the Eighth Amendment)"
1. Deference to the Medical Judgment of the Prison Doctor
Several aspects of the Estelle deliberate indifference standard re-
quire prison officials to accord great deference to the opinions of the
treating physician. 151
 First, intentional interference with prescribed
medical treatment constitutes deliberate indifference.' 52
 In addition,
prison officials should defer to the treating physician's opinion by
defining medical needs as "serious" once they have been identified as
such by a doctor exercising professional judgment)" Thus, once a
physician has characterized an illness or injury as serious and has
just that the public be required to care for the prisoner, who cannot, by lesson of the deprivation
of his liberty, care for himself.").
"5 See Estelle, 429 U.S. at 103.
"6
 See id. at 104. "Deliberate indifference" has been referred to as the subjective prong of
the standard and asks whether the prison officials acted with a sufficiently culpable state of mind.
See Wilson v. Scher, 501 U.S. 294, 298 (1991). "Serious medical needs" is considered to be the
objective prong and asks whether the deprivation was sufficiently serious. See id.
"7 See Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106.
148 See id. at 107.
149 See id. The Court stated that "[In]edical malpractice does not become a constitutional
violation merely because the victim is a prisoner." Id.
111° See id. at 104.
151
 See, e.g., Monmouth County Correctional Inst. Inmates v. Lanzaro, 834 F.2d 326, 347 (3d
Cir. 1987); Derrickson v. Keve, 390 F. Supp. 905, 907 (D. Del. 1975); Marc,). Posner, The Estelle
Medical Professional Judgment Standard: The Right of Those in State Custody to Receive High-Cost
Medical Treatments, 18 Am. J.L. & MED. 347, 351-52 (1992).
152 See, e.g., Inmates of Allegheny County Jail v. Pierce, 612 F.2d 754, 762 (3d Cir. 1979)
(holding that Eighth Amendment violation established where prison authorities prevent inmate
from receiving recommended treatment for serious medical needs); Pugliese v. Cuomo, 911 F.
Supp. 58, 62-63 (N.D.N.Y. 1996); Derrickson, 390 F. Supp. at 907.
In See Lanzaro, 834 F.2d at 347; Posner, supra note 151, at 351. Medical needs are also
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ordered a particular treatment, prison officials cannot violate or ignore
the order—the prisoner is constitutionally entitled to the treatment
which the medical professional decides is necessary.'"
For example, in 1975, in Derrickson v. Keve, the United States
District Court for the District of Delaware held that refusing to allow
a prisoner serving a life sentence to elect physician-recommended
surgery violated the Eighth Amendment.'" In Derrickson, the prisoner
suffered from severe repeated headaches and constant congestion.'"
Two physicians recommended that the prisoner undergo surgery, one
advising that the operation take place "as soon as possible."'" The
court stated that this surgery was generally considered to be elective
rather than emergency in nature because many patients with similar
conditions decide against undergoing the operation.'" The court rea-
soned that for this particular prisoner, however, the elective aspect of
the surgery was removed because he was serving a life sentence.'" The
court distinguished this situation from one in which a prisoner seeks
treatment that he might elect to have performed once released from
prison.'" Because the prisoner in this case would never be released,
refusing to provide him with the surgery would render his condition
irreparable.''' The United States District Court for the District of Dela-
ware thus held that where a physician recommends that an inmate
serving a life sentence undergo surgery, a decision never to allow the
prisoner to elect to have the surgery would violate the Eighth Amend-
ment.'"
In 1996, in Pugliese v. Cuomo, the United States District Court for
the Northern District of New York refused to grant summary judgment
against a state prisoner who alleged that prison officials disregarded
medical instructions that he receive physical therapy because the state
considered serious if they as e so obvious that even a layperson could recognize that they required
medical attention. See Lanzaro, 834 F.2d at 347; Posner, supra note 151, at 352.
154 See Lanzaro, 834 F.2d at 347; Derrickson, 390 F. Supp. at 907; Posner, supra note 151, at
352.
155 390 F. Supp. at 907.
166 See id. at 905.
167 See id. The physicians recommended a tonsillectomy and "subttrucus resection of the nasal
septum." See id.
156 See id. at 906.
159 See id. at 907.
16° See Derrickson, 390 F. Supp. at 907.
161 See id.
162 See id. Failing to provide the surgery to dale, however, is not a violation of the Eighth
Amendment. See id. Although Dern' cltson was decided berm e Estelle, it prohibited prison officials
from ignoring the recommendations of prison doctors. See id. This prohibition was embodied in
the Estelle standard. See Posner, su pra note 151, at 351-52.
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did not want to pay for the treatrnent.' 63
 A prison doctor prescribed
physical therapy three times weekly along with electrostimulation for
injuries sustained in an accident before the prisoner was incarcer-
ated.' 64
 The plaintiff was transferred six times and did not receive the
prescribed treatment on a consistent basis. 165
 A prison physician re-
sponded to his complaint about the perceived denial of medical treat-
ment by saying that he would never waste the state's money on such
treatment.' 66
 The court reasoned that the plaintiff's allegations of in-
terference with his prescribed physical therapy treatments and elec-
trostimulation constituted allegations of a wanton disregard for his
medical needs. 167
 The United States District Court for the Northern
District of New York thus held that prison authorities who interfere
with treatment prescribed by the prisoner's doctor could violate the
Eighth Amendment.' 68
Another aspect of the Estelle standard which gives deference to the
prison doctor's opinion relates to the definition of "serious" medical
needs. 169
 Medical needs are considered "serious" when they are diag-
nosed as such by a doctor or when they are so obvious that even a
layperson could recognize that they require medical attention.'" A
doctor's opinion on whether a condition constitutes a serious medical
need receives great deference so long as the process by which the
doctor arrived at this conclusion conforms to generally accepted pro-
fessional standards.' 7' A doctor whose treatment of a patient varies
significantly from accepted medical practice will be deemed to have
acted with deliberate indifference towards the prisoner, thus violating
167 911 F. Supp. at 68-64.
164 See id. at 60.
165 See id. at 60-61.
166 See id. at 61.
167 See id. at 62-63.
168
 See Pugliese, 911 F. Supp. at 62-63; see also Williams v. O'Leary, 805 F. Supp. 634, 638 (N.D.
Ill. 1992) (holding that prisoner sufficiently alleged deliberate indifference to serious medical
needs where prison doctors ignored outside physicians' prescription and u eated inmate ineffec-
tively with antibiotics to which infection was resistant).
169
 See Posner, supra note 151, at 351-52.
170 See, e.g., Lanzwv, 834 F.2d at 347 (stating that a medical need is serious if it has been
diagnosed by a physician as requiring treatment or is so obvious that a layperson would easily
recognize the necessity of a doctor's attention).
171
 See Inmates of Allegheny County, 612 F.2d at 762 (defering to prison medical authorities
implies an assumption that the medical authorities have reached an informed, professional
medical judgment); Posner, supra note 151, at 352. Because treatments chosen for inmates
through an exercise of professional judgment are roughly the same treatments that professionals
prescribe to society in general, the Estelle standard equates the standard of care to which prisoners
are entitled to the standard of care available in the community at large. See Posner, supra note
151, at 361, 364.
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the Estelle standard. 17" For example, in 1974, in Williams v. Vincent, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that throw-
ing away a portion of the prisoner's ear, rather than attempting to
reattach the severed portion, could constitute deliberate indiffer-
ence. 173 In Williams, a prisoner was assaulted by another inmate and
lost a large part of his right ear. 174 He alleged that the prison hospital
personnel told him that he did not need his ear, threw it away and
sewed up the stump with ten stitches.' 75 The court reasoned that the
doctors could have been acting out of deliberate indifference towards
the prisoner's medical needs because a concerned doctor would have
tried to reattach the ear of a patient if it were practicable.'" The court
stated that deliberate indifference may have caused the prison doctors
consciously to choose an easier and less efficacious treatment.'" Thus,
the Second Circuit held that a prison doctor's deliberate choice of a
less efficacious treatment could violate the Eighth Amendment.'"
2. Cost of Treatment
Another crucial aspect of the Estelle standard is that it does not
consider the cost of the treatment as influencing the prisoner's right
to medical care.'" This differs significantly from the procedural due
process context, where the court balances the individual's interest
against the state's interest, including cost.' 8° In Eighth Amendment
jurisprudence, the court balances individual and governmental inter-
ests only in the context of discipline and security; the state's interest
in limiting expenditures is not considered.' 81 Occasionally, however,
172 See White v. Napoleon, 897 F.2d 10.% 110-11 (3d Cir. 1990) (holding that allegations of
physician's repeated use of drugs without a valid medical reason, solely to inflict pain on the
prisoner, were sufficient to state claim of violation of the Eighth Amendment); Martinez, 443 F.2d
at 923, 925 (ignoring doctor's orders by moving prisoner before he was ready to be moved and
forcing him to stand on his injured leg after surgery, causing operation to fail, could violate
Eighth Amendment); P .osner, supra note 151, at 352.
173 508 F.2d 541, 544 (2d Cit. 1974).
174 See id. at 543,
175 See id.
178 See id. at 544.
177 See id.
178 See Williams, 508 F.2d at 544.
178 See, e.g., Lanzarb, 834 F.2d at 336, 351; Martin v. DeBruyn, 880 F. Supp. 610, 615 (N.D.
Ind, 1995); Posner, supra note 151, at 353.
1811 See Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 348 (1976) (stating that government's interest in
limiting expenditures is a factor that must be considered in determining whether certain proce-
dural safeguards are required prior to an administrative decision rcgatding social security eligi-
bility); Posner, supra note 151, at 353-54.
181 See Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 320 (1986) (holding that deliberate indifference in
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courts have allowed cost considerations to affect the determination of
the extent of medical care that the state is obligated to provide under
the Eighth Amendment. 182
 Nevertheless, most courts that have ad-
dressed the issue have found that a lack of funds cannot justify an
unconstitutional level of medical treatment for inmates.t 83
A few cases have stated explicitly that the court should consider
financial concerns when determining the extent of medical treatment
required by the Eighth Amendment.' 84
 For example, in 1977, in
Bowring v. Godwin, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit held that prison inmates are entitled to psychiatric treatment
based upon reasonable cost and time, if a physician exercising ordinary
skill concludes that the prisoner has a serious problem which may be
substantially alleviated through treatment.I 85
 In Bowring, the petitioner
was denied parole in part because of the results , of his psychological
evaluation, which stated that he would not successfully complete a
parole period.' 86
 He thus maintained that the state's failure to provide
him with psychiatric treatment, in order that he might ultimately
qualify for parole, constituted cruel and unusual punishment and
violated his due process rights. 187
 The court first noted that there is no
difference between the right to medical care for physical ills and for
psychiatric ills. 188
 The court reasoned, therefore, that inmates are enti-
tled to psychiatric treatment if failure to provide it would constitute
deliberate indifference to serious medical needs.' 89
 The court stated
that the limited right to psychiatric treatment stems from the Eighth
Amendment, interpreted in light of "the evolving standards of decency
that mark the progress of a maturing society."19° Thus, the Fourth
the medical care context can be established or disproved without balancing competing institu-
tional and individual concerns, unlike prison security issues, where competing obligation of the
prison to maintain safety and security must be balanced against the prisoners' individual rights);
Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 546-47 (1979) (maintaining institutional security may require
limitation of prisoners' and detainees' constitutional rights); Posner, supra note 151, at 353-54.
182 See Woodall v. Foti, 648 F.2d 268, 272 (5th Cir. 1981); Bowring v. Godwin, 551 F.2d 44,
47-48 (4th Cir. 1977); Posner, supra note 151, at 359-60.
183 See infra notes 192-227 and: accompanying text,
184
 See Woodall, 648 F.2d at 272; Bowring, 551 F.2d at 47-48; Posner, supra note 151, at 359-60.
188 551 F.2d at 47-48.
186 See id. at 46.
187 See id
188 See id. at 47.
18" See id. at 47-48.
INSee Bowring, 551 F.2d at 48: The court stated that lin] odern science has rejected the
notion that mental or emotional disturbances are the products of afflicted souls, hence beyond
the purview of counseling, medication and therapy." Id. at 47; see also United States v. DeCologcro,
821 F.2d 39, 43 (1st Cir. 1987) (stating that the inmate's entitlement to medical treatment is
reasonably commensurate with modern medical science).
September 1998]	 ORGAN TRANSPLANTS FOR PRISONERS 	 1271
Circuit held that prisoners have a right to reasonable psychiatric treat-
ment, but approved the use of cost as a consideration in determining
the extent of that right. 191
The majority of courts, however, have reached the opposite con-
clusion and held that a lack of funds can never justify providing
unconstitutional levels of medical care to inmates.' 92 For example, in
1985, in Ancata v. Prison Health Services, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit held that the refusal of medical
personnel to provide the diagnostic care prescribed by prison health
officials, in part because petitioner could not pay for the services, could
constitute deliberate indifference to serious medical needs. 193 In An-
cata, the petitioner, a pre-trial detainee, began to suffer from a variety
of serious symptoms.'" The treating physician suggested an orthopedic
or psychiatric evaluation, but informed the petitioner that he would
not be referred without a court order and that a court order would
not be entered unless he agreed to bear the costs of the evaluation.'95
Eventually the petitioner obtained the court order and the orthopedist
recommended a neurological evaluation.'" The petitioner was hospi-
talized after this evaluation and diagnosed with leukemia. He died four
months after the appearance of his symptoms.'97 The court stated that
knowledge of the necessity of medical care and intentional refusal
to provide it constituted deliberate indifference.'" Furthermore, the
court stated that delay in medical treatment cannot be justified as a
means to coerce payment and that delaying treatment for any non-
medical reason is deliberate indifference. 199 The court pointed out that
a state statute placed responsibility on the county to insure that ade-
191 See Bowring, 551 F.2d at 47-48; see also Woodall, 648 F.2d at 272 (setting forth a balancing
test, which includes the availability and expense of the treatment, to assess claims of unconstitu-
tional denial of psychiatric car c).
192 See, e.g., City Of Revere v. Massachusetts Gen. Hosp., 463 U.S. 239, 245 (1983); Lanzaro,
834 F.2d at 350-51; Ancata v, Prison Health Serv., 769 F.2d 700, 704 (11th Cir. 1985).
193 769 F.2d at 704.
194 See id. at 702. The petitioner experienced, among other things, hyperventilation and
double vision. See id. laccause the plaintiff was a pre-trial detainee, the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment rather than the Eighth Amendment was the applicable constitutional
provision. See id. at 703 11,5. The court pointed out, however, that the due process rights of a
pre-trial detainee arc at least as great as the Eighth Amendment rights of a convicted prisoner.
See id.
10 See id. at 701, 702.
199 See id.
197
 See id. at 702.
199 See Ancata, 769 F.2d at 704. The court cited Ramos v. Lam: "Deliberate indifference to
serious medical needs is shown when prison officials have prevented an inmate from receiving
recommended treatment or when an inmate is denied access to medical personnel capable of
evaluating the need for treaunent." 639 F.2d 559, 575 (10th Cir. 1980).
199 See Ancata, 769 F.2d at 704.
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quate funds were provided to meet the medical needs of inmates."
Thus, the Eleventh Circuit concluded that a shortage of funds cannot
justify an unconstitutional lack of medical treatment for inmates. 20 '
Several cases have analyzed whether the government has an obli-
gation to pay for medical treatment when there are other means
available to pay for the care, including a prisoner's personal funds."
For example, in 1983, in City of Revere v. Massachusetts General Hospita4
the United States Supreme Court held that once the government
provides needed medical care, state law—not the federal Constitu-
tion—dictates how the cost of that care should be allocated between
the government and the care provider." In City of Revere, Revere
police officers shot and wounded a man as he fled the scene of a
crime." The officers called an ambulance to transport the man to
Massachusetts General Hospital ("MGH"), where he was admitted for
nine days." MGH sued the City of Revere ("City") to recover the full
cost of the services rendered to the gunshot victim." The Court
reasoned that the City had met its Eighth Amendment obligation by
taking the victim to the hospital and ensuring that he received proper
care for his injury.207
 The Court further reasoned that the allocation
of the cost of treatment between the government and the care provider
was not a constitutional question but a matter of state law." The Court
noted several means, other than state funding, through which the
government could obtain payment for the services, but added that, if
it can obtain the necessary care for a detainee only by paying for it,
then it must pay for the treatment." The Supreme Court thus held
200 See id. at 705. The court stated that "Eallthough the statute makes clear that the county
can seek reimbursement front a person incarcerated, the plain wording of the statute indicates
that the county has the responsibility for securing adequate medical treatment. A prisoner does
not have to bargain for medical care' Id. at 705 it.7. The court also pointed out that the county
was unable to absolve itself of its constitutional or statutory duties by contracting with an entity
such as Prison Health Services. See id. at 705.
261
 See id. at 702.
202 See, e.g., Collins v. Romer; 962 F.2d 1508, 1513 (10th Cir. 1992); Martin, 880 F. Supp. at
615.
2°3 463 U.S. at 245.
224
 See id. at 240.
205 See id. at 241. The total bill for his treatment was 57,948.50. See id. He was again
hospitalized for fifteen days at a cost of 55,360.41. See id.
2°6 See id. Because the patient had not been found guilty of anything at the time he received
medical treatment, the Court analyzed the case under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment rather than the Eighth Amendment. See id. at 244. The Court noted that due process
rights are at least as great as the Eighth Amendment rights available to convicted prisoners. See
id.
207 See id. at 245.
208 See City of Revere, 463 U.S. at 245.
229 See id. The Court noted that some hospitals are required to provide free care to indigents
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that the government must pay for the medical care of detainees and
prisoners with government funds when that is the only means available
to obtain the necessary medical care. 21 °
Similarly, in 1987, in Monmouth County Correctional Institutional
Inmates v. Lanzaro, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit held that the County of Monmouth ("County") could not
condition the provision of needed medical services on the inmates'
ability to pay and that the County must fully assume the cost of all
inmate abortions if there are no alternative funding methods.'" In
Lanzaro, several inmates at Monmouth County Correctional Institution
brought a class action suit to enjoin the County from enforcing a
requirement that female prisoners secure court-ordered releases and
their own funding in order to receive an abortion which was not
medically necessary while in the County's custody. 212 The court stated
that providing funds for an elective abortion would not burden the
prison's limited resources, because it imposed no greater burdens than
those that already exist under the County's responsibility to provide all
pregnant inmates with proper pre- and post-natal care.2 's Furthermore,
the court noted that a prison's obligation to accommodate the right
to choose abortion should not be treated differently than the obliga-
tion to accommodate other fundamental rights, such as access to the
courts, for which prison funds are routinely expended.'" The court
reasoned, however, that accommodations of the right to choose abor-
tion might not require the expenditure of prison funds, so long as the
government ensures that adequate means exist to allow the inmate to
choose abortion. 215 The court stated that the prison could not condi-
tion the provision of necessary medical services, which it has an affir-
mative duty to provide, on the inmate's ability or willingness to pay. 2 I6
The court cited City of Revere for the proposition that the County must
assume the cost of providing inmates with the necessary medical care
in the absence of alternative means of funding. 2 ' 7 Thus, the Third
Circuit held that if an inmate elects to have an abortion and is unable
and that the government way be able to recover the costs of uratment directly front the detainee.
See id, at 245 n,7,
210 See id. at 245.
211 834 F.2d at 350-51.
212 See id. at 328.
215 See id. at 341.
2 " See id. at 343.
215 See id. at 343-44. The Court cnviswiied the possibility of philanthropic groups and other
organizations such as Planned Parenthood assisting the prim:niers in paying for abortions. See id.
at 344 11.27.
216 See Lanzaro. 834 F,2d at 351,
217 See id. at 350-51.
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to pay for the procedure, the government has an obligation to secure
funding for the procedure. 2 ' 9
In 1995, in Martin v. DeBruyn, the United States District Court for
the Northern District of Indiana held that the Eighth Amendment did
not guarantee free medical care to those who are able to pay for it, but
that failure to provide treatment for serious medical needs to inmates
who cannot afford to pay for it violated the Eighth Arnendment. 219 In
Martin, the plaintiff, who was receiving treatment for ulcers and had
a prescription from a doctor for certain over-the-counter ("OTC")
medication, alleged that the Department of Correction's policy for
dispensing OTC medications violated his Eighth Amendment right to
be free from cruel and unusual punishment. 22° The policy prohibited
inmates from receiving OTC medication on sick call unless it was part
of a necessary treatment for a serious medical condition, which would
have required them to purchase the OTC medications from the com-
missary. 22 ' The court reasoned that the plaintiff's ulcers were a serious
medical need because a prison doctor had prescribed treatment for
them and because, if left untreated, ulcers may cause intense and per-
sistent pain and .perhaps require emergency surgical intervention. 222
• The court refused to defer to the Deparunent of Correction's list of
"serious" medical problems, which did not include ulcers, because the
policy of deferring to the judgment of prison officials carries less
significance in the context of medical care. 223 The court concluded that
prison officials would only exhibit deliberate indifference, thus violat-
ing the Eighth Amendment, by refusing to provide the prescribed OTC
medication if the plaintiff did not have sufficient resources to pay for
it. 224
 The court recognized that, because incarceration prevents a per-
son from seeking medical care of his own choosing, the state must
provide some degree of care for serious medical needs. 229 The court
reasoned, however, that this principle did not forbid a state from
requiring that an inmate pay for his medical treatment to the extent
that he is able to do 50.226
 Thus, the United States District Court for
218 See id.
219 880 F. Supp. at 615.
220 See id. at 612-13.
221 See id. at 612.
222 See id. at 614.
222 See id.
224 See Marlin, 880 F. Supp. at 615.
225 See id. at 614- 15.
226 See id. at 615. The court stated that "(t)he Eighth Amendment guarantees only that states
will not ignore an inmate's serious medical needs; it does not guarantee Free medical care." Id.
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the Northern District of Indiana held that withholding necessary care
for serious medical needs because the inmate cannot pay for the
treatment violated the Eighth Amendment.227
In response to escalating health care costs and shrinking budgets
for correctional institutions, some jurisdictions have passed laws per-
mitting prison authorities to deduct funds from prisoners' trust ac-
counts to pay for medical services provided during incarceration, 228
The Federal Prisoner Health Care Copayment Act is currently pending
before the United States Senate, 229 It would require inmates to make a
copayment of between three and five dollars for all self-initiated medi-
cal visits but specifically states that no prisoner can be refused treat-
ment because he is unable to pay the fee.23° Prisoners have filed federal
lawsuits challenging state payment statutes under both the Eighth and
Fourteenth Amendments. 28 ' For example, in 1992, in Collins v. Romer,
the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit held that the
Colorado payment statute, which assessed a three-dollar charge for
self-initiated visits to a physician, dentist or optometrist, was constitu-
tional. 282 The court, however, recognized that an earlier version of the
law, which assessed the three-dollar fee for all visits including referral
visits initiated by medical personnel, was unconstitutional. 2" Speci-
227 See id. The court denied the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment because there was
insufficient evidence of his ability or inability to pay for the prescribed medicine. See id. at 616.
225 See, e,g., NEV. REV, S-rxr. ANN. § 209.246 (Michic 1993) (allowing director of prisons to
establish reasonable deduction from inmate's account to defray costs of inmate's medical care);
Tax. Calm. Paoc. CODE ANN. § 104.002(d) (West Supp, 1994) (requiring person who received
medical care while in a county jail to pay for such services when rendered). At least 20 states have
implemented statewide prisoner health care copayment programs. See Thomas, supra note 28.
Generally, prison trust funds operate as follows: prisoners receive work assignments for which
they arc paid prison scale wages, which are then credited to the inmates' trust accounts. See
Shields, supra note 114, at n.113. The inmates may spend the funds as they choose or as the court
orders. See id. Because many prisoners and detainees come from lower socioeconomic classes and
have no outside savings, the only funds they have available arc in their inmate trust accounts. See
id. at 285. Thus, if an indigent inmate is requited to pay for his medical treatment, the money
in his trust account is most likely the only source from which to draw, See id.
229 S. 494, 105th Cong. (1997). Section (2)(e) states that "[n]othing in this section shall be
construed to permit any refusal of treatment to a prisoner on the basis that—(1) the account of
the prisoner is insolvent; or (2) the pi isonei is otherwise unable to pay a fee assessed under this
section in accordance with subsection (d) (1)." Id. § 2(c).
239 See id.
231 See, e.g., Collins, 962 F.2d at 1510 (challenging Colorado's payment statute under Eighth
Amendment); Scott v. Angelone, 771 F. Stipp. 1064, 1065 (D. Nev. 1991), of d, 980 F.2d 738, 1992
WL 354598 (9th Cir. 1992) (challenging application of Nevada's payment statute as a violation
of Fourteenth Amendment due process rights).
232 962 F.2d at 1510, 1514,
255 See id, at 1511, 1513, 1514. The plaintiffs challenged both the earlier and amended
versions of the Act. See id.
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fically addressing the earlier version of the Act, the plaintiffs claimed
that the three-dollar fee constituted cruel and unusual punishment
because it was disproportionately large compared to inmate wages."
The inmates argued that this forced them to choose between seeking
medical treatment and purchasing basic hygiene products, because few
prisoners could afford both."' In 1990, at a hearing on the prisoners'
motion for attorneys' fees, the court held the earlier version of the
statute unconstitutional. 236 The court reasoned that, because the in-
mate level of pay was "far, far below" the three-dollar fee required by
the statute, it effectively deprived indigent inmates of meaningful ac-
cess to medical care. 237
 Furthermore, the court reasoned that the stat-
ute was particularly harsh on the chronically ill or those who had to
visit a doctor on more than one occasion for the same illness. 238 The
court upheld the constitutionality of the amended statute, however,
because it applied the three-dollar fee only to limited medical visits. 239
Thus, the Tenth Circuit held that inmates can be required to make
payments which help defray the costs of their medical treatment, but
only in a limited manner which does not deny them meaningful access
to health care.24°
3. Transplant Cases
In 1996, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
squarely addressed the issue of post-transplant care for inmates in
Miller v. Schoeneri. 24 ' In Miller, the court held that the inmate had
produced enough evidence to allow a reasonable jury to conclude that
the prison doctors knew about his serious medical needs and did not
address them, thereby violating the Eighth Amendment. 212 The plain-
tiff alleged that, because of a heart transplant he had received four
years prior to his incarceration, he required six types of specialized
234 See id. at 1510.
235 See id. at 1510-11.
"'See id. at 1511, 1513.
2" See Collins, 962 F.2d at 1513.
238 See id.
2" See id. at 1510-11, 1514; see also Saw, 771 F. Supp. at 1067 (finding four-dollar fee
constitutes reasonable deduction from inmate trust account for self-initiated medical visits).
240 See Collins, 962 F.2d at 1510, 1513, 1519.
241 75 F.3d 1305 (8th Cir. 1996).
242 See id. at 1307, 1311. This case was an interlocutory appeal from a denial of summary
judgment based on qualified immunity. See id. at 1307. Thus, the court had limited jurisdiction
and addressed only the narrow question of whether the defendant doctors knew of the prisoner's
need for specialized case and whether they acted reasonably in light of that knowledge. See id.
at 1309.
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medical care which were not provided at an adequate level during his
incarceration. 245 The court reasoned that a jury could disbelieve the
prison doctors' defense that, because the plaintiff's body had not
rejected his heart and he was still alive, their treatment must have been
adequate and instead could conclude that the plaintiff had survived in
spite of the doctors' inadequate treatment.'" The court concluded that
a reasonable jury could find that the prison doctors acted with delib-
erate indifference to the plaintiff's serious medical needs. 245 Thus, the
Eighth Circuit held that failure to provide adequate post-transplant
care for transplant patients could violate the Eighth Amendment. 246
In 1991, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh
Circuit considered guidelines promulgated by the Federal Bureau of
Prisons ("Bureau") regarding the funding of organ transplants."' In
Fernandez v. United States, the Eleventh Circuit held that prison officials
did not treat the medical needs of a prisoner with deliberate indiffer-
ence by refusing to provide him with highly specialized medical treat-
ment and failing to grant him a medical furlough, reduce his sentence,
grant him parole or pardon him so he could seek the treatment on his
own.'" The plaintiff suffered from terminal coronary artery disease
and sought through various legal means to reduce his sentence so he
could undergo a life-saving heart transplant. 24° In denying the pris-
oner's request for a medical furlough, the Federal Bureau of Prisons
adhered to its guidelines, which required prisoners to establish their
ability to pay for an organ transplant procedure and the willingness of
a transplant program to consider accepting them before granting a
furlough.250 The court refused to grant the prisoner's request for a
medical furlough because the record did not show that he had filed
the required documentation with the Bureau. 25 ' Although the court
did not explicitly address the validity of the requirements, it referred
to them as "reasonable guidelines." 252 The court recognized that the
245 See id. at 1307-08, 1310. The inmate was serving a "lengthy sentence." Id. at 1307.
244 See id. at 1310.
245 See id. at 1311.
246 See Miller, 75 F.3r1 at 1311.
247 See Fernandez v. United States, 941 F.2d 1488, 1493 (11th Cir. 1991).
246 Id, at 1494.
246 See id. at 1491. According to the petitioner, he was told by a physician in 1988 that he
would not live more than two years without a heart transplant. See id. He was serving two
concurrent twelve-year prison terms at one or the principal medical facilities in the federal prison
system. See id. at 1490.
256 See id. at 1493.
251 See id.
252 See Fernandez, 941 F.2d at 1493.
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medical care essential to the prisoner's long-ter ►
 survival was not
available through the prison system, but nevertheless held that his
condition had not been treated with deliberate indifference. 2" Thus,
the Eleventh Circuit held that enforcing the guidelines of the Bureau,
which effectively denied the petitioner the opportunity to receive an
organ transplant, did not constitute deliberate indifference to serious
medical needs and, therefore, did not violate the Eighth Amend-
ment.254
In some cases, prisoners were denied requests for medical care
because the type of treatment requested was rare or still in the devel-
opment stages. 255 For example, in 1974, in Hampe v. Hogan, the United
States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania held that
the petitioner was not entitled to a particular type of treatment that
was in the extremely early stages of development and was capable of
being performed by only a very few surgeons in limited circum-
stances.256 In Hampe, the petitioner argued that the prison medical sys-
tem was incapable of performing sphincter muscle transplants, which
he claimed was necessary to cure his severe rectal problems. 257
 He had
letters from three private surgeons stating that a sphincter transplant
might be an available remedy, although the operation was still in the
primitive stages. 258
 The court stated that two standards are used to
determine the adequacy of medical treatment provided to prisoners:
(1) whether the prison doctors abused their discretion; or (2) whether
the treatment was reasonable. 259
 The court noted that, by either stand-
ard, the prisoner is not the judge of what treatment need be provided
to him.26° The court observed that the prisoner had received the most
intensive treatment that the federal prison system could provide and
that the additional treatment he sought was still in the extremely early
stages of development. 261
 In addition, the court expressed concern that
the sphincter muscle transplants would not cure the prisoner's real
medical problem.'" Thus, the United States District Court for the
253 Ste id. at 1494. The court noted that the prisoner had received treatment at the Mayo
Clinic and had undergone several specialized procedures, as well as constant monitoring and
medication at the prison. See id.
251
 See id. at 1493, 1494.
256 See, e.g., Hampe v. Hogan, 388 F. Supp. 13, 15 (M.D. Pa. 1974).
"6 1d.
257 See id. at 13-14.
258 See id. at 14.
258
 See id. Hampe was decided before Estelle and thus did not use the Estelle medical profes-
sional judgment standard.
266 See Hampe, 388 F. Supp. at 14.
261 See id.
262
 See id.
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Middle District of Pennsylvania held that the prisoner was not entitled
to receive the rare, experimental method of treatment he sought. 265
V. THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT AND THE GOVERNMENT'S REFUSAL TO
FUND PRISONERS' ORGAN TRANSPLANTS
A. Application of the Estelle Standard
The Estelle standard established by the United States Supreme
Court bases violations of the Eighth Amendment on deliberate indif-
ference to serious medical needs. 264 Failure to provide funding for
medically necessary organ transplants for prison inmates does not
satisfy the Estelle standard and, thus, violates the Eighth Amendment
for a number of reasons. 266 First, the Estelle standard does not take the
cost of the treatment into account, so the high cost of organ transplants
should not weigh against the obligation to provide this type of care. 266
In addition, as shown in City of Revere and Martin, courts have consis-
tently held that the government cannot withhold necessary medical
treatment because of the inmate's inability to pay. 267 As illustrated by
Inmates of Allegheny County and Pugliese, courts have also recognized
that prison officials cannot interfere with the treatment of serious
medical needs prescribed by a doctor, as long as the doctor's decision
is within the range of professionally acceptable standards. 2" Once a
transplant center has approved an inmate for a transplant, prison
authorities are prohibited from interfering with the treatment; failure
to provide funds for the procedure where the inmate herself cannot
raise the money is as much an interference with the treatment as is
failing to administer proper dosages of medication or otherwise disre-
garding doctor's orders. 269 Finally, "evolving standards of decency" re-
quire Eighth Amendment jurisprudence to evolve contemporaneously
with society. 2" Although organ transplants were once considered rare
and experimental, their status in the medical community has risen
263 See id.
264 See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976).
205 See supra notes 109-240 and accompanying text.
266 See supra notes 179-240 and accompanying text.
267 See City of Revere v. Massachusetts Gen. Hosp., 463 U.S. 239, 245 (1983); Martin v.
DeBruyn, 880 F. Stipp, 610, 615 (N.D. Ind. 1995); see also supra notes 186-240 and accompanying
text.
2°6 See Inmates of Allegheny County Jail v. Pierce, 612 F.2d 754, 762 (3d Cir. 1979); Pugliese
v. Cuomo, 911 F. Supp. 58, 62-63 (N.D.N.Y. 1996); see also supra notes 151-78 and accompanying
text.
2"9 See Inmates of Allegheny County, 612 F.2d at 762; Pugliese, 911 F. Supp. at 62-63; see also
supra notes 151-78 and accompanying text.
27° See Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100-01 (1958).
1280	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW
	 [Vol. 39:1251
considerably over the past few decades and some organ transplants are
becoming routine, cost-effective treatment options for thousands of
patients each year."' This suggests that prisoners should be constitu-
tionally entitled to this treatment."'
As in Ancata, where the court held that a lack of funds did not
justify an unconstitutional lack of medical care for inmates, a particular
prisoner's inability to pay for a medically necessary organ transplant
does not preclude him from obtaining this treaunent. 275
 The U.S.
Constitution obligates the state to fund the procedure."' The treat-
ment at issue in Ancata was diagnostic in nature—the inmate's doctors
had recommended orthopedic, psychiatric and neurological evalu-
ations. 275
 This type of medical care is undoubtedly less costly than an
organ transplant, but the principle remains the same. The Estelle stand-
ard does not allow cost to influence any decision to provide care; it
does not say that cost can be considered when the procedure is unusu-
ally expensive. 276
Although it is unfortunate that expensive medical procedures are
cost-prohibitive and, thus, unavailable to many members of society, the
government is not legally obligated to provide costly health care pro-
cedures to all of its citizens.'" This obligation extends only to those
whom the state has incarcerated because these individuals are denied
the opportunity to care for themselves."' One commentator, James
Childress, argues that there is a societal obligation to provide funds to
all citizens who cannot afford expensive transplants; significantly, none
of his arguments rely on a legal obligation."" Rather, Childress points
271
 See LINOS—Newsroom: Critical Data, supra note 46.
"a See infra notes 273-367 and accompanying text.
276 See Ancata v. Prison Health Scrv., Inc., 769 F.2d 700, 705 (11th Cir. 1985).
274 See id.
276 See id. at 702; see also Ramos v. Lamm, 639 F.2d 559, 575 (10th Cir. 1980) (noting that
preventing an inmate from receiving prescribed treatment or denying an inmate access to medical
personnel capable of evaluating the need for treatment constitutes deliberate indifference).
276 See infra notes 287-93 and accompanying text. Some prison systems already recognize
their obligation to provide costly medical care when it is medically necessary. For example, the
Washington Department of Corrections pays for radiation therapy. See WASII/NCTON STATE DEPT
OF CORRECTIONS, supra note 90, § 3(1) (A).
277 See Friedman, supra note 13, at 923 (noting that Estelle makes the incarcerated the only
Americans who have a constitutional guarantee of medical care at government expense); el
Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 74 (1972) ("We do not denigrate the importance of decent, safe
and sanitary housing. But the Constitution does not provide judicial remedies for every soda]
and economic ill."); Monmouth County Correctional Inst. Inmates v. Lanzaro, 834 F.2d 326, 341
(3d Cir. 1987) ("[W]hile the government must provide prisoners in its custody with adequate
food and housing, no such affirmative duty is deemed to exist as to the nation's poor and
homeless.").
"a See Estelle, 429 U.S. at 103-04.
279 See Childress, supra note 35, at 109.
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out that society has a responsibility to meet the basic needs of its
members, including insuring that "all citizens be able to secure an
adequate level of health care without excessive burdens."28° He noted
that the Task Force on Organ Transplantation strongly recommended
that the federal government, as a last resort, pay for non-experimental
extrarenal transplants for economically disadvantaged patients who
have no other means of funding the transplants. 28 ' This recommenda-
tion focused on notions of justice and fairness, rather than a legal
duty. 282 In formulating its proposal, the Task Force considered the
ethical responsibility of providing for the basic needs of society's mem-
bers as well as the inequity of procuring organs from the community
at large, including the poor, while regulating access to the donated
organs through the ability to pay. 285 Americans who need organ trans-
plants, but are unable to afford them, exemplify the difficulty of secur-
ing funding for expensive medical procedures. 284 The government,
however, is not constitutionally obligated to provide health care to
these citizens as it is obligated to those it imprisons. 285
There is a line of cases holding that, if a prisoner is unable to
afford necessary medical care, the state cannot withhold treatment and
must pay for the care."' For example, in Monmouth County Correctional
Institutional Inmates v. Lanzaro, the Third Circuit stated that, in the
absence of alternative means of funding, the county had the duty to
assume the costs of providing its inmates with necessary medical care. 287
Although the care at issue in Monmouth was an abortion procedure,
the court did not limit its holding to the abortion context; it stated
that the correctional institution could not condition the provision of
"needed medical services," which it is duty-bound to provide, upon the
inmate's ability to pay. 288 Similarly, in Martin v. DeBruyn, the United
States District Court for the Northern District of Indiana did not limit
its language to payment for the low-cost over-the-counter medications
280 See id. (quoting PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN
MEDICINE AND BIOMEDICAL RESEARCH, SECURING AccEss TO HEALTH CARE vol. 1 (1985)).
"I See id. at 110 (quoting TASK FORCE ON ORGAN TRANSPLANTATION, ORGAN TRANSPLANTA-
TION: ISSUES AND RECOMMENDATIONS at 99-105 (Apr. 1986)).
282 See id. The Task Force also considered the continuity between certain organ transplants
and other forms of health care that are part of the decent minimal level of ewe that society is
obligated to provide. See id.
285 See id. In addition, the Task Force noted that excluding the poor from the allocation
process fostered distrust in the system and ultimately reduced the overall supply of donated
organs. See id.
284 See supra notes 30-37 and accompanying text.
285 See supra notes 277-78 and accompanying text.
288 See supra notes 192-227 and accompanying text.
287 834 F.2c1 326, 351 (3d Cir, 1987).
288 See id.
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at issue in that case. 289 Although the holding specifically referred only
to prescribed OTC medicine, the court stated in dicta that prison
officials who withhold "necessary medical care" to indigent inmates
violate the Eighth Amendment. 29° Based on the courts' broad language
referring to medical care generally, it does not appear that courts are
concerned with whether the cost of the treatment was at the high or
the low end of the cost continuum. 29 ' Also, these courts have never
reserved the question of whether they would decide differently if a
more expensive treatment had been at issue. 292 This seems to indicate
a true indifference to the cost of medical care when the treatment is
required constitutionally. Thus, although the courts have never ad-
dressed specifically whether the state must pay for an organ transplant
if the inmate cannot afford it, the language in the cases implies that
the Eighth Amendment would require such an expenditure 299
The Eleventh Circuit, however, has implied that it is the responsi-
bility of the inmate seeking the transplant to secure funding for the
procedure. 294 In Fernandez v. United States, the court implicitly ap-
proved the Federal Bureau of Prisons's guidelines requiring prisoners
seeking organ transplants to establish their ability to pay for the pro-
cedure before obtaining a medical furlough. 295 The court upheld the
denial of the prisoner's request for a medical furlough because he had
not filed the required documentation demonstrating his ability to
pay.296 This holding, coupled with the court's language referring to the
guidelines as "reasonable," implies that the court approved of the
policy of requiring inmates within the federal prison system to pay for
transplants themselves. 297 The court gave no reasoning for this propo-
sition, however, and failed to address the Eighth Amendment implica-
tions. 298 It seems to conflict directly with the deliberate indifference
standard articulated in Estelle, especially given that the guidelines as-
sume that a transplant team is already considering the prisoner for
medical approval. 299 Once a physician has prescribed a course of treat-
"2 880 F. Supp. 610, 615 (N.D. Ind. 1995).
299 See id..
"I See id.
"2 See Lanzaro, 834 F.2d at 326; Martin, 880 F. Supp. at 610.
293 See supra notes 286-92 and accompanying text.
294 See Fernandez v. United States, 941 F.2d 1488, 1493 (11th Cir. 1991).
295 Id.
296
 See id.
297 See id. This guideline applies only to prisoners within the federal system; each state has
its own guidelines.
2" See id.
299 See Fernandez, 941 F.2d at 1493.
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ment, prison officials are prohibited from interfering with the pris-
oner's ability to obtain the treatment; failing to pay for the treatment
would constitute interference, and, thus, deliberate indifference R 00
The caveat which the United States Supreme Court attached to its
holding in City of Revere v. Massachusetts General Hospital signifies the
Court's concern with inmates who are unable to afford medical care."'
The Court left the question of cost allocation to state law, but noted,
"if, of course, the governmental entity can obtain the medical care
needed for a detainee only by paying for it, then it must pay."'" Thus,
while it is up to an individual state to enact copayment statutes and
otherwise formulate policy about the contributions they expect from
inmates for their health care, if an inmate is without funds to pay for
constitutionally required care, the government must somehow secure
the funds."' Similar to Lanzaro and Martin, the Supreme Court in City
of Revere framed this obligation generally, by using the term "medical
care" instead of limiting the statement to the type of treatment at issue
in the case."' This shows that the Court was not limiting the obligation
to provide medical care to relatively low-cost procedures."' Had it
wanted to make a distinction, it easily could have articulated its desire
to reserve the question of whether the governmental entity must pay
for treatments which are significantly more expensive than the treat-
ment considered in this case.
In addition, the payment statute cases indicate that the courts will
impose limits on prison officials' authority to fund medical care for an
inmate using the inmate's personal trust account."' In Collins v. Romer,
the Tenth Circuit concluded that the original version of the Colorado
payment statute was unconstitutional because the three-dollar fee
charged to inmates whenever they saw a physician was disproportion-
ately large. 907 The court was concerned that the fee assessment was so
out of proportion to prisoner wages that it could operate to deny
meaningful access to medical care; the court realized that it could take
days or even weeks for an inmate to earn the three dollars to cover the
visit.'" Three dollars is a trivial amount compared to the thousands of
309 See supra notes 151-78 and accompanying text.
301 463 U.S. '239, 245 (1983).
302 See id.
3°3 See id.
304 See id. The detainee in this case was treated for a gunshot wound. See id. at 240.
305 See id. at 245.
3 th5 See, e.g., Collins v. Romer, 962 F.2d 1508, 1513 (10th Cir. 1992); Scott v. Angelonc, 771 F.
Supp. 1064, 1067 (D. Nev. 1991), aff'd, 980 F,2d 738, 1992 WL 354598 (9th Cir. 1992).
3°7 771 F, Supp. at 1511, 1513.
" See id, at 1513.
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dollars required to pay for an organ transplant s°9
 Given that the court
determined that three dollars for every visit to a physician was uncon-
stitutionally burdensome on inmates without outside income, it seems
obvious that requiring an inmate to secure funding for an organ
transplant is unconstitutional as wel1. 310
 Because the cost is so much
greater, the burden on the inmate would, of course, be proportionately
greater. The plaintiffs in Collins alleged that the three-dollar fee forced
them to choose between basic medical care or basic hygiene necessi-
ties, because few inmates could afford both.'" Requiring prisoners to
fund their own organ transplants does not provide them with even the
constitutionally questionable option of choosing medical care over
hygiene products, because inmates with no outside income would
never be able to earn sufficient funds to pay for the transplant. The
fact that the court found the 1989 amended version constitutional
because it only assessed the three-dollar fee for self-initiated visits to a
physician is significant." It suggests that the court was willing to re-
quire the inmate to accept some responsibility for his health care
expenses, but only to an extent that would not be exceedingly burden-
some and force him to choose between medical care and other basic
necessities." That being said, the court was only willing to require
reasonable payments from the inmates.'" In light of the Collins decision,
the cost of an organ transplant clearly would constitute an unreason-
able payment.'''
Some commentators suggest that, although cost was not consid-
ered in the original Estelle standard, changed circumstances, such as
the rising cost of health care, dictate that financial matters be factored
309 See UNOS—Patients, supra note 30. Organ transplants can cost in excess of 5300,000 in
the first year alone. See id.
so See Collins, 962 F.2d at 1511.
311 See id.
sis See id.
313 See id. Prows v. United States Department of justice held that the government's program to
charge inflates for their medical care was within their authority to reform and rehabilitate
prisoners..704 F. Supp. 272, 275 (D.D.C. 1988), affV, 938 F.2d 274 (D.C. Cir. 1991). The court
stated that such programs encourage inmates to satisfy their legitimate financial obligations and
demonstrate their acceptance of responsibility. See id. The objectives of rehabilitation and reform
are not, however, furthered by requiting inmates who have no possible way to pay for an organ
transplant to forego this life-saving procedure. Requiring prisoners to pay for treatment which
they plainly cannot afford or else forego treatment altogether does not qualify as a legitimate
element in the process of rehabilitating and reforming prisoners. See generally Shields, supra note
114, at 298-300. In fact, the Fifth Circuit has recognized that deficiencies in health care and
hygiene foster inmate frustration and resentment, which in turn thwart the purported goal of
rehabilitation. See Newman v. Alabatita, 503 F.2d 1320, 1333 (5th Cir. 1975).
314 See Collins, 962 F.2d at 1511, 1513.
316 . ee id.
September 1998]	 ORGAN TRANSPLANTS FOR PRISONERS 	 1285
into the determination of what level of medical care must be pro-
vided. 316 Sister Rosemary Donley argues that technological advances
have forced physicians to begin considering cost, both to the patient
and to the system, in making decisions about access to treatment.'"
Another commentator, Wesley Shields, has argued that if the realm of
health care decisions has changed to the extent that doctors are re-
quired to include cost in their treatment decisions, then the Estelle
standard which prohibits the consideration of cost must be aban-
doned. 315 He proposes a new standard with a fee scale tied to the
inmate's wages which defines exactly how much can be charged for
specific medical services. 919 He makes special allowances for indigent
inmates, however, and stresses that inmates should receive the neces-
sary treatment before the government pursues reimbursement." 2° The
special provision for indigent inmates unable to pay for care illustrates
that even proponents of balancing the state's financial interest against
the prisoner's interest in receiving health care recognize that, when
the inmate is utterly without means to finance his treatment, the
government remains responsible."' This principle is reflected in the
Federal Prison Health Care Copayment Act currently pending before
the United States Senate. 522 The Act requires prisoners to make copay-
ments of three to five dollars for each self-initiated medical visit and
for certain prescriptions, but specifically exempts inmates who cannot
afford the fee. 323 Section 2(e) of the Act states that prison officials
316 See CURTIS PIMUT & ROBERT N. Ross, CARE AND PUNISHMENT: THE DILEMMAS OF PRISON
MEDICINE 232 (1988) (aiguing that health care both in and out of prisons must resolve tension
between three competing considerations; right to cafe, acceptable standards of care, and cost);
Sister Rosemary Dcmley, A Brave New World of Health Gore, 2 J. CONTEND'. HEALTH L. & POLY
47,51-52 (1986); Shields, supra note 114, at 297,300-01.
317 Seenonley, supra note 316, at 52-53 (arguing "Nealth care professionals need to include
cost in their decisional paradigms").
"See Shields, supra note 114, at 301. The acceptance of the use of cost as a factor in
treatment decisions for patients in the private market may not translate into acceptance of the
use of cost as a factor in treatment decisions for prisoners. See Posner, supra note 151, at 367. In
the private market, if it is the patient herself who will pay for the care and who considers the cost
of various treatments in making the ultimate decision regarding the appropriate care, then it is
acceptable for the doctor to suggest different treatment options based on cost. See id. In the
prison setting, however, the state, not the patient, bears the cost of the treatment. See id. Thus,
all gains or losses based on the cost of the medical care fall on the state, impairing patient
autonomy. See id. The prisoner, unlike the "free" patient, is unable to perform a cost-benefit
analysis because the decision will be made for her, See id.
319 See Shields, supra note 114, at 301.
321) See id.
321 See id.
322 See S. 494, 105th Cong. (1997).
323 See id. § 2 (c ) .
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cannot refuse to treat prisoners because they are unable to pay the
required fees. 324 Payment is the government's obligation in the first
instance and reimbursement can be sought from the inmate only when
possible. 323 Accordingly, when an inmate without financial resources
requires an organ transplant, legislation would demand that the gov-
ernment must supply the funds. 326
Even if one concedes that cost can be considered in determining
what treatment to prescribe, it may not influence the prison authori-
ties' deference to the medical doctor's decision once it. is made."' If,
after considering cost, a transplant team determines that an organ
transplant is necessary, prison officials cannot object on the basis of
cost because they must defer to the doctor's prescribed treatment,
assuming that the doctor reached his conclusion regarding appropri-
ate treatment using generally accepted professional standards. 328 By
analogy, if prison authorities interfere with a prescribed transplant by
failing to pay for it, their actions would constitute deliberate indiffer-
ence. 529 In Pugliese, the court recognized that disregarding an outside
medical consultant's recommendation that an inmate receive physical
therapy because the state considered the expense a waste of the state's
money could be a constitutional violation."° This plaintiffs situation
is similar to the predicament of an inmate who has been medically
approved for an organ transplant, but the prison authorities fail to
provide access to the procedure."' The fact that the prison authority
does not want to pay for the treatment becomes irrelevant once it has
been prescribed by a doctor. 332 This has special meaning for inmates
who have life-threatening conditions which are degenerating quickly. 933
In such circumstances, time is of the essence; the sick inmate's health
will deteriorate, perhaps to the point of death, while prison authorities
324 see id
525 See, e.g., S. 494, 105th Cong. (1997); City of Revere, 463 U.S. at 245; Shields, supra note
114, at 301.
326 See, e.g., S. 494, 105th Cong. (1997); City of Revere, 463 U.S. at 245; Shields. supra note
114, at 301.
311 See supra notes 151-78 and accompanying text.
323 See, e.g., Inmates of Allegheny County, 612 F.2d at 762; Neese, 911 F. Supp. at 63-64;
Posner, supra note 151, at 351-52; see also supra notes 151-78 and accompanying text.
325 See Inmates of Allegheny County, 612 . F.2d at 762; Pugliese, 911 F. Supp. at 63-64; Posner,
supra note 151, at 351-52; see also supra notes 151-78 and accompanying text.
33° See Pugliese, 911 F. Supp. at 63.
531
 See id.
332 See Posner, supra note 151, at 351-52.
533 Cf. Liscio v. Warren, 901 F.2d 274, 276-77 (2d Cir. 1990) (holding that where inmate's
condition was life threatening and degenerating quickly, prison doctor's failure to examine over
three day period could violate the Eighth Amendment).
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ignore prescribed treatment. The sick inmate simply does not have the
time to wait.
In addition, if the inmate is serving a long sentence, ignoring the
prescribed treatment will operate as a permanent denial of medical
care because the inmate most likely will not have the opportunity to
obtain the treatment independently once released, if at all, from the
prison system."' In Derrickson v. Keve, the Federal District Court of
Delaware held that refusing to allow a prisoner serving a life sentence
to elect surgery which had been recommended by a physician would
violate the Eighth Amendments" Although the surgery was normally
considered elective, the court determined that the life sentence re-
moved the choice from this inmate: if prison authorities did not pro-
vide access to the operation, his condition would be irreparable." 6 The
same can obviously be said for an inmate who needs a life-saving organ
transplant: if her physical condition is deteriorating rapidly and she is
not expected to outlive the remaining duration of her sentence with-
out a transplant, then the state's failure to provide access to the trans-
plant procedure will render her condition irreparable and she will die.
Thus, if a prisoner is medically approved for a transplant by a physician
or transplant team using their best professional judgment, a court
should conclude that the prison must honor this medical decision and
finance the treatment.
B. Other Aspects of Eighth Amendment Analysis
A crucial aspect of Eighth Amendment analysis links the standard
for determining the scope of the Cruel and Unusual Punishment
Clause directly to public sentiment concerning the reasonableness of
punishments."' In Trop v. Dulles, the Court stated that the clause must
draw its meaning from "the evolving standards of decency that mark
the progress of a maturing society."'" The Court intended that, as so-
ciety evolved and became more technologically (and perhaps mor-
ally) advanced, the definition of cruel and unusual punishment would
evolve contemporaneously to reflect society's modernized views on
what constitutes humane treatment of prisoners.n 9 This is reflected
in the way courts have interpreted the Eighth Amendment over the
334 See Derrickson, 390 F. Supp. at 907.
335 Id.
335 See id.
3" See Trop, 356 U.S. at 101; Shields, supra note 114, at 277-78.
33/3 356 U.S. at 101.
sag
	
id.
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years. 54° For example, in Bowring v. Godwin, the Fourth Circuit held,
and the vast majority of courts later agreed, that denial of psychiatric
and psychological care came within the purview of the Cruel and
Unusual Punishment Clause."' In holding that a prisoner had a right
to psychiatric treatment, the Fourth Circuit noted that there was no
distinction between the right to medical care for physical ills and its
psychiatric counterpart."' It emphasized the increased role of psychi-
atric care in modern society and pointed out that at least one Court
of Appeals had considered psychiatric care in testing the constitutional
validity of systemwide prison conditions. 543 Thus, the court recognized
that society's standards had evolved and had made psychiatric care a
scientifically acceptable form of medical treatment. 544
When organ transplant technology was in its developmental
stages, it held the same status as psychological care held before its use
became widespread—such treatment was considered to be experimen-
tal and rare. As late as 1986, Medicare did not cover heart, heart/lung
or pancreas transplants because they were considered experimental by
the National Institute of Health."6 Today, transplant technology has
made significant advances. Most transplants are no longer considered
experimental; Medicare, for example, now covers heart, liver and lung
transplants.346 In addition, thousands of transplants are performed
each year and virtually all transplant procedures have experienced
increased success rates in recent years."' A large independent agency,
UNOS, is maintained with the sole purpose of coordinating transplant
activity throughout the country."B American citizens are becoming
34° See supra notes 112-40 and accompanying text; see also Shields, supra note 114, at n.38
(citing Carlene Caning Carraba, Pr'isoner's Constitutional Right to Medical 1l'eatment: A Right
Without Substance? 7 NEW ENG. J. ON PIUSON L. 341, 348 (1981)) (stating that public opinion
about what constitutes humane treatment may change over time and this factors into determining
a punishment's constitutionality).
341 Bowring v. Godwin, 551 F.2d 44, 47 (4th Cir. 1977).
"2
 See id.
343 See id. The court stated that the Fifth Circuit, in Newman u Alabama, considered the
inadequate treatment of mentally ill inmates as a factor in determining that Alabama penal system
was operating in violation of the Eighth Amendment. See id. at 47.
34'
	
id. at 47.
343 See Cotton & Sandler, supra note 34, at 78.
348 See 60 Fed. Reg. 6537 (1995); 56 Fed. Reg. 15,006 (1991); 52 Fed. Reg. 10,935 (1987).
347 See Cotton & Sandler, supra luxe 34, at 75; UNOS—Newsroom: Critical Data, supra note
46. Nearly 20,000 transplants, or 55 per day, were performed in 1997. See LINOS Newsroom:
Critical Data, supra. The UNOS 1997 Annual Report stated that one-year graft and patient survival
rates for all organs improved nearly every year between 1988 and 1995, with the greatest improve-
ments seen among lung and heart/lung transplants. See UNOS: Annual Reporl•Dala
(visited June 9, 1998) <http://www.uttos.otg/Data/anrpt97/anrpt_datahigh.hun >.
348 See supra notes 39-74 and accompanying text.
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more accepting of organ transplants as an effective means of medical
treatment and nationwide efforts have been launched to increase or-
gan donation.'" Organ transplantation is thus moving toward the sta-
tus that psychiatric care had achieved in 1977 when Bowring was de-
cided.'" If this is so, then evolving standards of decency suggest that
prison inmates should obtain this treatment, even if unable to fund
the procedures themselves." 1
In some cases, such as Hampe v. Hogan, the courts have been
reluctant to force prison authorities to provide rare and experimental
medical treatments that are still in the development stages. 352 This case,
however, can be distinguished from the organ transplant context. First
of all, it was decided before Estelle, and thus may not have significant
precedential value in light of the new standard announced in that
case.'" In addition, the medical care at issue in Hampe was far more
"experimental" than certain organ transplants are today.'" The plain-
tiff in Hampe sought a sphincter muscle transplant, a sophisticated
surgery which was in the extremely early stages of development and
capable of being performed by only a very few surgeons in limited
circumstances."' In contrast, organ transplants, especially kidney and
liver replacements, are performed thousands of times each year and
are available at transplant centers throughout the country.'" Some
prisoners receive transplants every year—usually bone marrow or kid-
ney replacements.'"
Hampe can be distinguished for another reason. In addition to the
treatment's experimental status, the court was concerned by the phy-
349 See Organ Co' Tissue Coalition on Donation (visited June 9, 1998) Chttp://wwwshareyour-
life.org>. This is a site by the National Coalition on Donation.
35° See Dowsing, 551 F.2d at 44.
See Trop, 356 U.S. at 101; Bowring, 551 F.2d at 47; ef. U.S. v. DeCologero, 821 F.2d 39, 43
(1st Cir. 1987) (finding that Federal Bureau of Prisons is required to provide medical services at
a level reasonably commensurate with modern medical science); Friedman, .supra note 13, at 948
("(Slocietal expectations of medical care, which are a key consideration in the evaluation of
Eighth Amendment claims, arc heightened as a tenth_ of continuing advancements in medical
technologies.").
352 Hampe v. Hogan, 388 F. Supp. 13, 15 (M.D. Pa. 1974); see also OFFENDER HEALTH PLAN,
Supra note 276, § 3.
353 See Hampe, 388 F. Supp. at 13. The court applied two standards: whether the prison's
medical authotitics abused their discretion and whether the ueatment tendered has been rea-
sonable. See id. at 14.
3" See id. at 15.
355 See id.
556 See UNOS--Newsroom: Critical Data, supra note 46. There as e 275 medical institutions
throughout the country which operate organ transplant programs. See id.
957 See Grygotis, supra note 75. Kidney transplants are actually cost-effective because they
eliminate the need for costly dialysis. See id.
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sicians' consensus that sphincter muscle damage was not the plaintiff's
real problem and that the transplant might actually retard the plain-
tiff's healing. 358 In contrast, if a transplant team medically approves a
patient for a transplant, it can be assumed that the failure of the organ
in need of replacement is the patient's real problem and that the
transplant will help alleviate the problem. 958 If this were not the case,
the patient would not receive medical approval for the transplants°
Thus, the Estelle standard dictates that prison authorities respect the
medical judgment of the treating physician and pay for the procedure
if the inmate has no personal resources upon which to rely. 36 '
The courts are slowly beginning to consider the special obligations
of prison systems to organ transplant patients. 362 The Eighth Circuit,
for instance, has recognized the duty of the state to maintain heart
transplant patients. 363 In Miller v. Schoenen, the plaintiff survived sum-
mary judgment by alleging facts sufficient to allow a reasonable jury
to conclude that he had particular medical needs as a transplant
patient and the defendant prison doctors did nothing about them, 36'
By recognizing that the defendant's failure to provide the prisoner with
the specialized treatment he required may have constituted deliberate
indifference, the court implicitly held that the state could be obligated
to pay for the provision of these medical services. 365 The court expressly
recognized that the defendants were required to provide the prisoner
with adequate care. 366 If the jury determined that anything less than
the six specific treatment needs of heart transplant patients would
constitute inadequate treatment, then the state would be required to
provide the six treatments.367 Requiring the state to pay for mainte-
nance of transplant patients is not significantly different from requir-
ing the government to pay for the actual transplant procedure, if the
transplant is the only adequate treatment for the patient's illness.
358 See Hampe, 388 F. Supp. at 15.
351/ See supra note 262 and accompanying text.
388 See supra notes 55-57 and accompanying text.
381 See supra notes 151-78 and accompanying text.
382 See, e.g., Miller v. Schoenen, 75 F.3d 1305, 1310 (8th Cir. 1996); Fernandez, 941 F.2d at
1488.
363 See Miller, 75 F.3d at 1310.
384 See id.
385
 See id.
388 See id.
367
 See id.
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CONCLUSION
Estelle v. Gamble established that deliberate indifference to the
serious medical needs of prisoners violates the Eighth Amendment. 368
Judicial interpretation of this standard clearly dictates that prisoners
are entitled to medical treatment prescribed by a physician, so long as
the physician exercises professional judgment. 369 if such conditions are
met, prison authorities cannot interfere with the provision of this
treatment for any reason, including the inmate's inability to pay for
the treatment." The progressive nature of the Cruel and Unusual
Punishment Clause considers society's "evolving standards of decency"
in determining what violates the Eighth Amendment."' These factors
require that prison authorities, whether pursuant to a written policy or
as a result of a case-by-case analysis, obtain funding for a medically
necessary organ transplant when no alternative sources of funding are
available and the prisoner cannot afford to pay for it herself. Failing
to provide the funds after the transplant has been recommended by a
medical transplant team, which is possible under the Washington State
Offender Health Plan and the Federal Bureau of Prisons Guidelines,
and actually happened to James Earl Ray, impermissibly impedes the
prisoner's access to medical care. 372 This is not to say that the prison
authority must pay for the transplant using prison funds—it is free to
obtain the money from other sources, including the inmate herself."
If the only available option, however, is for the prison authorities to
pay for the transplant, then they must do so."4 Several decades ago,
prison officials would probably not have been required to pay for organ
transplants, because they were considered rare and experimental. To-
day, however, they are generally accepted in the medical community
and are performed regularly throughout the United States." Evolving
standards of decency thus require the government to make this level
of care available to prisoners as well.
There is an obvious disparity between the level of care available
to prisoners and that available to some groups of free citizens unable
to afford adequate medical treatment." The government's obligation
368 429 U.S. 97,109 (1976).
369 See supra notes 141-263 and accompanying text.
57u See supra notes 141-263 and accompanying text.
371 Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86,101 (1958).
372 See supra notes 141-367 and accompanying text.
373 See City of Revere v. Massachusetts Gem Hosp., 463 U.S. 239,245 (1983).
374 See id.
375 See .supra notes 345-49 and accompanying text.
37° See Friedman, supra note 13, at 935.
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to provide adequate health care, however, is limited to those in its
custody and does not extend to society at large.3" In addition, it is not
sensible to lower the standard of care applied to prisoners to match
the level of care available to the least well off members of society."' A
more equitable solution involves raising the standards of health care
available to people presently unable to afford quality care, rather than
viewing their lack of health care as a benchmark which can be used to
limit the quality of care that prisoners receive."
It is up to the courts to identify when it is unconstitutional for the
federal or state governments to fail to pay for medically necessary
organ transplants when prisoners have insufficient resources to cover
the costs associated therewith. As Justice Brennan has remarked, the
courts have a special ability to remedy unconstitutional prison condi-
tions: "insulated as they are from the political process, and charged
with the duty of enforcing the Constitution, courts are in the strongest
position to insist that unconstitutional conditions be remedied, even
at significant financial cost."38° Given the questionable legislation and
administrative guidelines regarding the obligation of prison authorities
to pay for prisoners' organ transplants, which have been proposed by
both the federal and state governments, it is clear that the courts will
have to intervene to protect prisoners' rights to be free from this form
of cruel and unusual punishment,
JESSICA WRIGHT
377 See supra notes 277-85 and accompanying text.
"8 See Friedman, supra note IS, at 935.
"9 See id.
888
 Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 359 (1981) (Brennan, J., concurring).
